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#### The 1AC’s fear of Mexican violence is xenophobic exhibitionism---it contributes to a narrative of criminality that produces structural violence Weissman 14

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Not perhaps since the 1910 Mexican revolution have conditions of violence and¶ criminality in Mexico so preoccupied the United States. Pages of American newspapers fill almost daily with graphic accounts of horrific crimes throughout Mexico, each more gruesome than the other: decapitations, execution-style mass murders, corpses in barrels of lye.1 Official U.S. governmental accounts attribute these acts variously to escalating warfare among drug cartels, a militarized response by the Mexican government to drug-cartel violence, and corruption.2 In its most sensational depiction, Mexico has been portrayed as a lawless country; violence has been represented as a full-scale drug war at our “doorstep.”3 Most recently, the crisis of arriving Central American children has been attributed to Mexico’s “very porous¶ border,” its “smuggling corridors,”4 and the “widespread and well-documented involvement of Mexican authorities with human smugglers and organized crime.”5¶ Accounts of Mexico have become familiar and formulaic. Any totalizing characterization that serves to flatten the Mexican landscape is not only inaccurate, but suggests a type of “Mexico-bashing” that finds sustenance into the dark interior of American nativism and xenophobia. Reports of the threat posed by drug-related violence to national security, fear for public safety posed by Mexican migration, and the depiction of the country as a pathway for human trafficking, have assumed distorted proportions.6 Certainly, the death toll, fear, and suffering have sharply risen since the Mexican government militarized its response to drug cartel violence.7 As a matter of geography, the tens of thousands of Central Americans fleeing gang- related violence born of failed drug-war policies, trade agreements, and corruption, travel the same corridors that traffickers often use to supply the drugs to meet an almost insatiable demand in the United States. In fact, the crime rate in most of Mexico is unexceptional and the overall¶ murder rate is lower than other countries in the region, and similar to the United States.8 Moreover, the crime rate generally throughout the country has declined.9¶ Mindful of the consequences of the distortions and the misinformation that leads to the misrepresentation of a people, Mexican civil rights groups have attempted to provide a more nuanced view of conditions in Mexico.10 Paradoxically, U.S. officials repeatedly state that the border is presently as secure as it has ever been.11 FBI reports and recent data indicate that accounts of “spillover violence” are unfounded.12 The United States describes the Mexican government as cooperative and working to “‘prioritize the safe and humane treatment of individuals’” who are deported to Mexico.13 This is not to minimize the violence that has cost Mexicans dearly. Rather, the seriousness of the situation requires an analysis of the drug-related violence that goes beyond the sensationalist descriptions which may chronicle the current turmoil¶ but reveals little about the political and socio-economic circumstances that give rise to the conditions of a drug war and to the “Mexican-as-criminal” narrative that pervades social relations and legal constructions in the United States.14¶ The construct of the Mexican as a menace is not new. It is possessed of a proper history with origins in the nineteenth century.15 Mexicans have been described as “‘earless and heartless creatures’, ‘semi-barbarians’, who were ‘only interested in satisfying their animal wants’”16 and as “uneducated and grossly ignorant, highly excitable, and given to spasmodic outbursts of passion, outlawry and violence.”17 They have been lynched for being “‘too Mexican,’” and harassed for speaking their native language or otherwise expressing their culture.18 They have long been considered the “prototypical illegal alien.”19¶ The discourse has served to rationalize social and legal policies and practices of exclusion. However, it is important to note that the master narrative of Mexican criminality has also been adopted by well-meaning legal advocates who have availed themselves of the drug violence narrative for humanitarian purposes and deployed to enhance an immigrant’s chance of remaining lawfully in the United States through various forms of immigration relief.20 Still others have used the specter of drug cartel violence to advocate for reformed, humane drug laws throughout the hemisphere.21

#### Turns the case---their representation of spillover violence and terrorism creates the ideal impetus for a militarized response Correa-Cabrera 14

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(Guadalupe, w/ Terence Garrett, and Michelle Keck, “Administrative Surveillance and Fear: Implications for U.S.-Mexico Border Relations and Governance,” European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, 96)

The fear of spill-over violence¶ There is no doubt that drug violence in Mexico has multiplied since the year 2006 when former Mexican president Calderón declared ‘war’ on drugs. It is also true that this strategy didn’t produce the desired results. In fact, some have even claimed that Mexico is on a path to becoming a ‘failed state’. According to Nicholas Casey and José de Córdoba of the Wall Street Journal, ‘some parts of Mexico are caught in the grip of vio- lence so profound that government seems almost beside the point’. They mentioned, for example, the cases of ‘Ciudad Mier and surrounding Ta- maulipas state’ (Casey and De Córdoba 2010, para. 22).5 What is more, mass killings in different parts of Mexico demonstrate just how little con- trol the federal government exerts over some Mexican states.¶ However, we do not believe that Mexico’s problems of drug violence pose a grave threat to the U.S. as some U.S media and politicians have charged. Clearly, rising violence is a threat to Mexico. But so-called spillover violence has so far been almost non-existent. Almost all the violence perpetrated by Mexican organized crime groups has remained south of the border (Correa-Cabrera 2012). ‘We have the occasional incident, (but) it is a very tiny fraction compared to what is going on the other side of the bor- der’ (Ybarra 2011, para. 21), wrote Tony Payan, an associate professor of political science at the University of Texas El Paso (UTEP).¶ Notwithstanding this fact, many Americans are deeply worried about a potential escalation of this phenomenon. Their worries give some U.S. politicians the opportunity to create a media spectacle about Mexico’s growing violence. Using their access to mass media, these politicians present a spectacular view of violence spiralling out of control in Mexico and threatening U.S. national security. The politicians see the violence the product of a so- called ‘narco-insurgency’ by Mexican TCOs whose habits of carrying out beheadings, mass killings, and bombings ‘are drawing comparisons to mur- ders by Muslim extremists’ (Aguilar 2010, para. 1).¶ Narco-terrorism and the politics of fear¶ Some top-level U.S. government officials – including Joseph W. Westphal, the former Under Secretary of the Army, and former Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton – have suggested Mexico is under siege by a narco- insurgency or narco-terrorists.6 During a U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, a top adviser to President Obama said ‘terrorists seek- ing to unleash havoc in the United States could use Texas’ porous border with Mexico to enter this country’ (Aguilar 2011a, para. 1). James Clapper, former Director of National Intelligence agreed and said that Mexico’s ex- treme drug violence ‘could pose a significant threat to the U.S’. (para. 2) (see Correa-Cabrera 2012, 207-8).¶ These officials are not alone. Former U.S. Rep. Silvestre Reyes (D-El Paso) has repeatedly charged that Mexican TCOs frequently commit acts of narco-terrorism. Reyes is in step with U.S. Rep. Michael McCaul, who, as already mentioned, has been seeking to designate seven of the top Mexican cartels as ‘foreign terrorist organizations’. According to Reyes, ‘such a des- ignation would provide additional tools to help combat drug cartels and the threat they pose to the security of the United States, Mexico, and Central and South America’ (Aguilar 2010, para. 9).¶ Many have suggested that troops be sent to the U.S. border to fight the alleged narco-insurgency and keep Mexico’s mayhem from spilling over the border. U.S. intelligence and security officials have suggested the exist- ence of ties between the major drug cartels operating in Mexico (such as the Zetas) and Hezbollah, Al Qaeda, or Al Qaeda affiliates. For example, Department of Homeland Security Secretary, Janet Napolitano, mentioned this possibility in testimony before a congressional committee in February of 2011. In particular, she expressed Washington’s concern because of an ‘eventual alliance between Al-Qaeda and the Zetas’ (Wilkinson 2011). But the spectacular form in which media has presented the risks of escalating spillover violence and alleged narco-insurgency – and even narco-terrorism – seems to depict an inaccurate and unrealistic panorama (Correa-Cabrera 2012, 208).¶ An alliance between the terrorists of Al Qaeda and the Mexican Zetas is unrealistic if one takes a close look at the goals and characteristics of these two organizations. Mexican TCOs ‘are not ideologically motivated and the Mexican government is trying to make a strong distinction between those things’, according to Eric Olson, a senior associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (Aguilar 2010, para. 11). Carlos Pascual, former U.S. ambassador to Mexico, has also ar- gued that there is no evidence the cartels have ‘a political ideology or a re- ligious ideology, and we need to make that distinction’. Pascual insists that ‘the lines should not be blurred to link the cartels with terrorist activities with an ideology’ (Aguilar 2010, para. 8).¶ But the idea that Mexican TCOs could ally themselves with terrorists has become a part of public discourse because of groups whose aim might be ‘to promote fear among the U.S. public in order to further their political and economic agendas’ (Correa-Cabrera 2012, 209). This fear has been used to justify draconian immigration laws and the deployment, in some cases, of troops to the border. Unfortunately, these types of actions are mis- guided and could seriously damage the relationship between Mexico and the U.S. In many cases, the politics of fear appear to respond to specific political, ideological and economic interests while closing off channels of cooperation and communication between the U.S. and its southern neighbour.

#### The narrative of Mexican escalation facilitates global policing and unrestrained militarism Weissman 14

---militarization incites Mexican escalation

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(Deborah, “The Politics of Narrative: Law and the Representation of Mexican Criminality,” SSRN

The narrative of Mexican drug war violence fits within the description of a “noisy construction [ ] manifest[ed] in moral panic accompanied by high levels of public, political, and media attention.”67 It performs as the specter of transnational crime and serves as the “new moral imperative” for extraterritorial intervention and transnational policing.68 The rhetoric of war has shaped the principles around which relations with Mexico are organized.69 As one expert observed, “[t]o frame the problem as an insurgency almost necessarily invites a military response”—and in this case, it is a response consummated through transnational legal processes.70 This section reviews the transnational legal agreements that have legitimized the militarization strategies and authorized U.S. intervention in the national security and constitutional legal affairs of Mexico.¶ (a). Bilateral Legal Transactions: Legalizing Military Initiatives¶ A series of militarization strategies have been countenanced through binational legal¶ transactions enacted between the United States and Mexico.71 These arrangements are best characterized by agreements that have authorized U.S. intervention in Mexico in the form of an armed offensive against drug trafficking organizations—a war fought on Mexican territory.¶ These agreements have legalized joint law enforcement operations within Mexico and on the U.S.-Mexico border.72 New accords have authorized U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents to carry out “in depth investigations” with Mexican law enforcement agents.73 U.S.-Mexico pacts have expanded the jurisdiction of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) whose agents have been permitted to engage in surveillance, arrests, and seizures in Mexico.74 They have empowered the U.S. military’s Joint Task Force-Six to conduct covert troop operations, eighty percent of these in Mexico.75 Some of these agreements require Mexican governmental institutions to accommodate the presence of U.S. agencies within their offices.76 Recently, U.S.-proposed legislation seeks to militarize Mexico’s southern border through a ‘‘Foreign Military Financing Program’’ in response to the crisis of Central American children fleeing violence.77 These legal transactions function as a “politics of authority” and reinforce fear and nationalistic rhetoric.78¶ The most important transnational legal response to the narrative of drug violence has been the Mérida Initiative, a congressionally funded mandate to intervene in the Mexican drug cartel phenomenon.79 Enacted in October 2007, this “regional security partnership” was¶ designed to develop a heightened military response to Mexico’s drug wars.80 A joint U.S.- Mexico statement set forth its primary purpose: “to maximize the effectiveness of our efforts to fight criminal organizations.”81 The plan, when first initiated, involved four goals: 1) break the power and impunity of criminal organizations; 2) assist in strengthening border, air, and maritime controls; 3) improve the capacity of justice systems; and 4) curtail gang activity and diminish the demand for drugs in the region.82¶ The Mérida Initiative was enacted to “enhance the ability of the Government of Mexico, in cooperation with the United States, to control illicit narcotics production, trafficking, drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), and organized crime” as well as to “strengthen respect for internationally-recognized human rights and the rule of law.” 83 Congress, at the inception, however, promoted the pact as one that needed to focus first and foremost on “assistance to the armed forces of Mexico.”84 Mérida Initiative funding has exceeded $1.2 billion in foreign aid, most of which has been allocated for the Mexican purchase of U.S. military equipment, new surveillance technologies, counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism, and for the training of Mexican police.85 U.S. military officials have deemed the Mérida Initiative a directive to prepare Mexico’s military “for a war much like the ones Washington is waging in Afghanistan and¶ Iraq.86 Since 2008, funding for the Initiative has doubled and is presently the largest U.S. foreign aid program. 87¶ Critics have questioned the very premises of the Mérida Initiative.88 Mexico experts have observed that the plan’s purpose was wrong-headed from the start:¶ “The official intention to ‘fight criminal organizations . . . [and] disrupt drug- trafficking . . . weapons trafficking, illicit financial activities and currency smuggling, and human trafficking’... cannot be reconciled with the Mexican military’s record of human rights abuses or with the fact that money laundering and weapons trafficking have never been tightly regulated by the United States.”89¶ As a result of these transnational agreements, human rights advocates have documented discernible and destructive consequences.90 According to 145 civil society organizations in the region, they have enabled war strategies that have resulted in a “dramatic surge in violent crime, often reportedly perpetrated by security forces themselves.”91 Efforts to suppress the cartels through military means demonstrably increased the violence and resulted in untold numbers of human rights abuses, including rapes, murder, harassment of labor and land activists, and torture of innocent citizens at the hands of security forces.92 Drug cartel operations became more sophisticated in response to Mérida’s military initiatives. Some Mexican soldiers trained by U.S. military personnel subsequently left the Mexican army and joined the violent cartels where they¶ have carried out acts of gruesome brutality.93 As one Mexican writer put it, “[y]ou didn’t have to be a genius to see that a military challenge to the narcos would lead to the militarisation of the narcos.”94 The U.S. State Department’s annual report on human rights in Mexico, notwithstanding its support for the Mérida Initiative, also found that “accusations of [Mexican] army abuses had risen sixfold” since the offensive against drug cartels began and documented evidence of extrajudicial killings, kidnappings, and torture.95 One human rights group observed that the Mérida Initiative has turned Ciudad Juárez into “Mexico’s Baghdad.”96

#### Focus on cartel violence masks and ignores our role in creating structural problems that devastate Mexican people – causes inequality, poverty, and violence – aff impacts are terminally non-unique. Carlos 14

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(Alfredo, “Mexico “Under Siege” Drug Cartels or U.S. Imperialism?,” Latin American Perspectives March 2014 vol. 41 no. 2, 10.1177/0094582X13509069)

The dominant discourse about Mexico in the United States has a long history and has affected the way Mexicans, Mexican-Americans, and Chicanos are viewed and treated. While much has changed since the 1800s, the current discourse about Mexico serves the same basic purpose. The United States legitimizes its expansionist economic foreign policy in terms of the burden of civilizing, uplifting, and promoting development in less developed countries, beginning with its neighbor to the south (Gonzalez, 2004: 185). It employs a foreign policy that advances its imperialist interests. U.S. government and media agencies generate a representation of Mexico that has provided avenues for very specific courses of action. Promoting a discourse of a “chaotic,” “unruly,” “failing state” has provided justification for direct U.S. military intervention, especially along the border, now potentially with armed drones (O’Reilly, 2013), and legitimized the penetration of U.S. capital interests in Mexico at the expense of Mexico’s own economy and, more important, its people. Even at its most basic level, we can only call this imperialism.¶ While Mexico has an ineffective justice system, government corruption, and crime and drug-related violence, these are problems that most modern nation-states also face. In fact, the United States is itself heavily implicated in the drug trade, holding by far the largest stocks of cocaine in the world and being Mexico’s primary market (INCB, 2008). It is also the largest supplier of arms not just to Mexico but to all of Latin America (Chomsky, 2012). Latin American countries are working together toward the decriminalization of drugs, which has produced very promising results in Portugal, while, in stark contrast, ”the coercive procedures of the 40-year U.S. drug war have had virtually no effect . . . while creating havoc through the continent” (Chomsky, 2012). But the conversation doesn’t revolve around what the United States can do to clean up its own act; it is about “othering” Mexico.¶ The United States has had a tremendous impact on Mexico’s internal dynamics regarding migration, unemployment, poverty, and crime. Its economic imperialism has contributed to the weakness of Mexico’s economy and as a result its internal politics. NAFTA has stunted Mexican economic growth and led to the mass displacement of workers, forcing them into job markets that they would not have considered had they had access to jobs with dignity. For many it has led to migration to the United States, while for others it has meant lives of crime and violence. But no one discusses this, and it gets no media coverage because the focus is not on the failed U.S.-imposed neoliberal economy but on drug-related violence. This is done purposefully, since the story does specific work and is perpetuated because it benefits U.S. economic interests and works as a mechanism of justification for continued U.S. imperialism.¶ For the most part, the concerns that the vast majority of people experience the vast majority of the time on a daily basis are not about these drug-violence outrages. Instead they are economic—how they will pay their bills and clothe, shelter, and feed their families. Even in the conversation about immigration reform, no one discusses the fundamental right that people have to live and grow in the place they consider home. No one discusses that people choose to migrate only when they have no other options. U.S. imperialism has led to people’s having no other option. Representing Mexico as a “failing state” allows the United States to evade responsibility for creating many of these problems in Mexico while also providing a powerful story to convince American citizens and Mexican politicians that U.S. economic intervention in Mexico is necessary.¶ The irony of it all is that NAFTA continues to be justified through a narrative of a chaotic and violent Mexico needing economic programs of development to solve its social problems, when in fact it is the penetration of U.S. capital that has caused many of those problems. The meta-narrative helps to perpetuate an asymmetrical power relationship between Mexico and the United States. The dominant discourse provides the veil for this “imperial encounter” to become a mission of salvation rather than of economic conquest. In the end, the way Mexico is represented in the United States has little to do with its actual internal political or social dynamics, instead it is a means to expand and maintain U.S. imperialism in Mexico. Over the past 150 years, one thing that has stayed the same is Mexico’s position as an economic colony of the United States, a place to go for cheap labor, raw materials, and cheap manufactures for consumption at home. Focusing on drugs and violence obscures this. While Mexico does have serious issues of drug-related crime, this crime is not the most severe of Mexico’s problems. Those problems are poverty and unemployment and the country’s inability, for the first time in its history, to feed its own people. Mexico is indeed “under siege”—not by drug lords but by U.S. economic interests—and this has had disastrous social costs for the Mexican people. This is not, however, the discourse we engage in. That discourse is purposefully absent.

#### The alternative is to reject the narrative of Mexican violence---this criticism disrupts racism and serves as a focal point for broader reorientation of our relationship to Mexico. Weissman 14

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Insofar as narratives are formed as socially-constructed and culturally-contingent artifacts, they provide insight into a larger “truths” about U.S.-Mexico relations. Narratives are not only an expression of social attitudes and nativist sentiments. They also develop in tandem with and within the law and legal discourse. They are both cause and consequence of a public mood.¶ This Article seeks to contribute to the scholarship that has examined the way that Latin Americans in general and Mexicans in particular have been subordinated through narratives in ways that bear on public policy, national interest, and law. It demonstrates that the discourse has implications that extend beyond U.S. borders into Mexico while reaching deep into local¶ neighborhoods and towns in the United States. It then considers whether alternative uses of the narratives and newly emerging characterizations are sufficiently disruptive of dominant discursive devices used to subordinate Mexicans.24¶ Part II examines the construction of the prevailing political narrative of the Mexican-as criminal at the transnational, national, and local level. It considers how the discursive uses of such stereotypes act to construct law that is, in turn, constitutive of the narrative. At the transnational, national, and state and local level, legal developments respond to and reinforce the construction of the Mexican as super-predator with dire consequences for communities on both sides of the border. At the transnational level, Mexicans perceived to be a danger to the United States are inscribed into the larger national angst of terrorism to which transnational policing in the form of a military response is deemed necessary. At the national level, the depiction of the criminal Mexican immigrant contributes to xenophobic excesses and is exploited as political scape-goading and often serves to divert attention away from the material reality of the political economic circumstances of migration that might otherwise inform immigration reform.25 At the state and local level, particularly in communities with histories of nativist sentiments and racial animus, the depiction of the Mexican criminal in their midst, in their schools, on their roads, and at their worksites, is used to justify policies of exclusion and community stratification.26 Racist tendencies are refueled and reinvigorated as a matter of social practices, particularly in the South.27¶ Part III then considers alternative uses of the dominant narrative of Mexico and Mexicans. It reviews the Mexican-as-criminal narrative as used by well-meaning immigration advocates who discern in the discourse of Mexico as a nation of criminality and lawlessness as a means to assist Mexican immigrants who wish to remain in the United States via asylum claims and other immigration remedies that require a showing of hardship upon returning.28 It then examines contesting narratives and shifting paradigms: from “Mexican-as-criminal” (bad neighbor) to “Mexican-as-economic partner” (good neighbor)—articulated either as a means to maintain U.S. dominance in the economic affairs in Mexico or as a remedial description that more accurately depicts changes effected by Mexican immigration.29¶ Narratives serve a purpose that can be discerned through an examination of the social circumstances in which specific discourses flourish. They are best understood when analyzed in the context of the political economic goals they seek to achieve, and by ascertaining who benefits and who is harmed.30 This Article concludes by suggesting the need to reexamine narratives in order to determine who benefits and who is harmed, and ultimately whether the narrative produces a usable framework to understanding and resolve the political economic structures that produce violence in Mexico.¶ II. Narratives at Work: The Mexican-as-Criminal¶ Narratives often function in the realm of contingency, as a matter of national interests and security requirements, shaped through the interaction of foreign policy needs with domestic political requirements. The current “Mexican-as-criminal” narrative provides a discursive¶ framework with which to shape the rationale of a foreign policy designed to expand U.S economic interests, even as it provides local power contenders the rhetoric to exploit racist attitudes and nativist sentiment for political ends. Indeed, control of the drug cartel violence discourse is critical to regulation of trade, labor, drug policy, gun control, immigration, and politics at all levels.31¶ The law, too, is complicit with the “logic” of the discourse of the violent Mexican as it is constitutive of the narrative. Clifford Geertz has elucidated this relationship, positing that legal thought is “constructive of social realities rather than merely reflective of them.32 Transnational legal processes compare similarly with the laws and legal policy at the federal, state and local level. Each tends to rely on strategies of escalating fear, militarization, and criminalization to address underlying political and socio-economic problems, many of which have structural dimensions and historical antecedents. These legal developments help to construct the phenomenon of the Mexican-as-criminal just as they regulate the day-to-day lives of Mexicans on both sides of the border.33

#### Make a spectacle of Mexican cartel violence collapses effective deliberation – rejection is a pre-requisite to effective border governance. Correa-Cabrera 14

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(Guadalupe, w/ Terence Garrett, and Michelle Keck, “Administrative Surveillance and Fear: Implications for U.S.-Mexico Border Relations and Governance,” European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, 96)

The media spectacle surrounding the Violence has led to a lack of public discourse useful in having deliberations for effective governance and civic understanding necessary for a healthy polis (Stone 2002) and a weakening of State Power.9 Through the corporate-owned news media, fear is promot- ed as a commodity through the selling of news and information sensational- izing Violence in Mexico, through U.S. media sources. The media spectacle (Debord 1967/1995; Agamben 1993; Bauman 2010; Kellner 2003, 2007, 2008) serves as a primary source for the promotion of Violence in the region. Politics has been truncated through the mean/ends utilitarian- induced market spectacle (Debord 1967/1995; Kellner 2003, 2007, 2008; and based on Arendt 1958), which effectuates a disruption of the polis through the ravages of the market (Stone 2002). The era of the politics of fear prevails on the border of the U.S. and Mexico through government ac- tors and non-governmental personnel utilizing the spectacle for material gain at the expense of civil society.

#### Discursive hyperbole has tangible consequences---it feeds the for-profit war machine and ensures subsequent policies are grounded in xenophobia Schack 11

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(Todd, “Twenty-first-century drug warriors: the press, privateers and the for-profit waging of the war on drugs,” Media,War & Conflict 4(2), 10.1177/1750635211406013)

Here we come to the heart of the matter: the media hype, hyperbole and moral panic have actual consequences, and it is worthwhile asking the cui bono question: who, exactly, is benefitting, because there are billions of dollars at stake, and the question of funding or¶ not funding certain contracts explains more about what’s really happening than all the sensational reports based on exaggeration, un-sourced claims, and lack of statistics.¶ Crucial to understanding this question of funding is one final point: that politicians in favor of the militarized response to the ‘drug war’ (which includes privatizing the effort) must hold at all times the simultaneously contradictory position that, while the problem is worse than ever, they are actually succeeding in their goals. Carlsen (2009: 1) points out that:¶ Through late February and early March, a blitzkrieg of declarations from U.S. government and military officials and pundits hit the media, claiming that Mexico was alternately at risk of being a ‘Failed State,’ a ‘Narco-state’, on the verge of ‘Civil War’, and as posing a direct threat to US National Security through ‘spill-over’ ... In the same breath, we’re told that President Calderon with the aid of the US Government is winning the war on drugs, significantly weakening organized crime, and restoring order and legality. None of these claims are true.¶ In fact, this rhetorical double-bind is not only stock-in-trade for the entire drug control establishment, and has been for years, but is familiar to a variety of what Howard S Becker (1963: 157) famously termed ‘moral entrepreneurs’:¶ Enforcement organizations, particularly when they are seeking funds, typically oscillate between two kinds of claims. First, they say that by reason of their efforts the problem they deal with is approaching solution. But, in the same breath, they say the problem is perhaps worse than ever (though through no fault of their own) and requires renewed and increased effort to keep it under control.¶ This rhetorical situation has defined the war on drugs since at least Nixon, and the enforcement organizations – the drug control establishment – have grown into what Reeves and Campbell (1994) call the ‘narco-carceral complex’ which, with the rise of privatization, has become the for-profit industrialization of the drug war.¶ In other words, there is nothing new regarding the rhetorical situation whereby this industry justifies itself, only pages taken out of a well-worn playbook and applied to the newest chapter in the continuing saga that is the drug war. What is new, however, is the fact that the private security contractors stand to benefit most – and that is precisely the point of this article:¶ The motivations behind the recent hype vary. Alarmist cries of a Mexican collapse help clinch the passage of measures to further militarize the southern border and obtain juicy contracts for private defense and security firms. Local politicians are finding they can be a cash cow for federal aid. (Carlsen, 2009: 2)¶ So too are the five firms who won the $15 billion dollar Pentagon contract in 2007, and aiding the effort was every breathless, over-hyped report of Mexico as a ‘failed state’, or of ‘spill-over’ violence, reports that are especially useful during yearly funding cycles, as happened in 2009:¶ The formation of local, state and national budgets at the beginning of the year provides an opportunity for politicians to exaggerate the threat posed by Mexican drug cartels and thereby receive more funding for local police forces ... Indeed, Texas Homeland Security Director Steve McCraw stressed that the spillover had already occurred in asking state lawmakers to approve a $135 million increase in funding requested by Texas Governor Rick Perry. (Arana, 2009)¶ Therefore this is not simply a matter of press hype and sensationalism – if it were it would be a matter of cultural relevance perhaps, but not political and economic. Using Becker’s term ‘moral entrepreneurs’, Reeves and Campbell (1994: 150) write that this synergy between the press and those who profit from a crisis is a well-established tactic in war profiteering:¶ In the political economy of drug control, journalism is a market force that often raises the stock of moral entrepreneurs who profit from escalations in the war on drugs ... Like the merchants of war devoted to perpetuating the power of the military-industrial complex, the moral entrepreneurs ... – and their journalistic comrades – are in the hysteria business.¶ This is precisely where moral panic theory and the concept of disaster capitalism con- verge, in the advancing of the three aligning interests: the press, which is perpetuating – and profiting from – the notion that the situation is at ‘crisis’ levels; the private security contracting industry, which is financially self-interested in perpetuating the ‘crisis’; and government, which is seeking methods of absolving itself from public accountability for carrying out unpopular policy, and plausible deniability for when things go wrong. What is crucial, and what moral panics have proved to be so proficient at doing, is the creation and maintenance of the notion of ‘crisis’, and the creation of an inextinguishable source of renewable enemies that justify the existence of these moral entrepreneurs-turned- industrialists. Writing about the crack cocaine scare in the 1980s, but relevant here, Reeves and Campbell (1994: 20) conclude that:¶ Consequently, with nothing to gain and everything to lose from declaring a victory in the war on drugs, the drug control establishment’s networks of power, knowledge, and discipline have a vested interest in maintaining a perpetual sense of urgency, even a sense of hysteria, about cocaine pollution.¶ It is in this way that the increasing use of private contractors, and the re-conceptualization of the wars on terror and drugs as for-profit endeavors can be likened to an addiction: ‘Our military outsourcing has become an addiction, and we’re headed straight for a crash’ (Singer, 2007). It is an addiction of policy that – if recent history in Colombia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and now Mexico are any guide – will result in impunity, plausible deniabil- ity, will make the 21st-century drug warriors very wealthy, and will not in any measurable manner result in

## Possible CP’s

### 1

The Mexican federal government ought to legalize growing of opium poppies for medical use. **CBSNews 16**

Mexico mayor: To beat opium farming, legalize it, March 18, 2016

The governor of one of Mexico's most violent states is making waves by proposing that impoverished farmers be allowed to grow opium poppies for legal medical use. Guerrero state is among Mexico's poorest, and many remote mountain communities already grow small plots of poppies, which are bought by drug cartels that have fought violent turf battles throughout the Pacific coast state. It has become the biggest opium-producing state in Mexico, supplying about half the heroin used in the United States. Guerrero Gov. Hector Astudillo suggested this week that farmers be allowed to produce opium for legal medical use.

Solves the aff – farmers would sell legally, kills huge source of income for cartels. **MexicoDailyNews 16**

Legal opium farming now part of debate, March 20, 2016

Some observers have said that legalizing the cultivation of opium, from which heroine and morphine are obtained, is a viable option that should be discussed, while others believe it will have a negligible effect in reducing the violence linked with drug trafficking. Astudillo saw legalization as offering an option for local farmers whose livelihoods currently depend on it. It is common for poor families to grow opium on small plots of less than half a hectare. Children are tasked with extracting opium gum, which is purchased by a drug cartel. It has become the only means of income for many farm families as their other crops are usually grown for their own consumption. Among the critics of the idea is the representative in Mexico of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Governor Astudillo’s approach “is not viable,” said Antonio Mazzitelli. The market for opium poppy is different than that for cannabis, he said. The market for opiates is controlled at the global level by the International Narcotics Control Board, a United Nations entity. In order for a country to become a legal producer of opiates, it must be able to comply with the board’s security and quality requirements. In Mexico, Mazzitelli pointed out, the poppy is grown in remote, mountainous regions where the state has little presence and the cost of providing security would be high. Not only that, he said, there isn’t sufficient demand. Instead, he suggested, the state should invest in “a long-term alternative development plan” by building schools, strengthening the police and justice systems and the creation of infrastructure and new economic activities that would enable local families to grow crops other than drugs. The drug policy coordinator of the civil organization Mexico United Against Crime disagreed with Mazzitelli. “The debate should focus on legal routes for opiate plantations, as an organized market would disempower organized crime and reduce violence, although it should not be considered the only solution,” said Lisa Sánchez.

### 2

The United States should prosecute bank employees who launder money.The counterplan is comparatively better than the plan. **Morris 13**

(Evelyn Krache [Research Fellow, International Security Program, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs @ JFK School of Govt, Harvard]; Think Again: Mexican Drug Cartels; Dec 3;www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/12/03/think\_again\_mexican\_drug\_cartels

"We Need to Hit Them Where It Hurts: the Wallet." Exactly. Despite the ongoing arguments about drug legalization and border security, the most effective way to combat the scourge of the DTOs would be to interdict not drugs or people but money. As in any business, money is the fuel that keeps the cartels running. Even if Sinaloa, to give only one example, were to disappear tomorrow, other organizations would quickly rise to take its slice of the lucrative pie. One of the most basic tenets of business is that highly profitable markets attract lots of new entrants. This is true for legal and illegal enterprises alike. The staggering profits of illegal trade would be much less attractive if the DTOs could not launder, deposit, and ultimately spend their money. But shutting down the cartels' financial operations will be a formidable task, given the help they have had from multinational financial institutions, which have profited from the cartels' large-dollar deposits. In 2010, Wachovia bank (which was acquired by Wells Fargo in 2008) admitted that it had processed $378 billion of currency exchanges in Mexico -- an amount equal to about one-third of the country's GDP -- to which it had failed to apply anti-laundering restrictions. In 2012, British bank HSBC settled with the U.S. government for $1.9 billion to escape prosecution for, among other things, laundering hundreds of millions of dollars for the Sinaloa cartel. U.S. law enforcement has also implicated Bank of America and Western Union in DTO money laundering. Although illegal money transfers can happen without banks' knowledge, the volume and widespread occurrence of these transactions indicate just how easy it is for the cartels to clean their dirty money. Paying a fine to avoid prosecution is almost no punishment at all. The fines Wachovia paid amounted to less than 2 percent of its 2009 profit. Even the record fine assessed on HSBC amounted to only 12 percent of the bank's profits. Furthermore, banks can simply accrue funds to offset any possible fines, either by increasing what they charge cartels or by setting aside some of the earnings from laundering, even as they continue to do business with the DTOs. Prosecuting bank employees involved in money laundering, up through the highest levels of an institution, would be a better tack. Pictures of a chief compliance officer as he entered a courtroom for sentencing would have a far greater deterrent effect than any financial penalty. To that end, investigative techniques and legal precedents for going after global criminal networks are increasingly robust, and the political payoffs could be substantial. One of the more successful campaigns in the war on terrorism has been the financial one; experience gained in tracking the funds of al Qaeda could make it easier to similarly unravel Los Zetas' financing. Malfeasance in the financial industry is nothing new, but public sensitivity to banks' wrongdoing is arguably higher than it has been in decades. An enterprising prosecutor could make quite a reputation for herself by tracking DTO money through the financial system. The cartels, along with the violence and corruption they perpetrate, are threats to both Mexico and the United States. The problem is a complicated one and taps areas of profound policy disagreement. The way to make progress in combating the DTOs is to ignore issues like gun control and illegal immigration and follow the money. Stanching the cartels' profits will do more to end the bloodshed than any new fence or law.

The CP controls the internal link to solving drug violence. **Murphy 13**

(Dylan; Money Laundering and The Drug Trade: The Role of the Banks; May 13; www.globalresearch.ca/money-laundering-and-the-drug-trade-the-role-of-the-banks/5334205

Mexico is in the grip of a murderous drug war that has killed over 150,000 people since 2006. It is one of the most violent countries on earth. This drug war is a product of the transnational drug trade which is worth up to $400 billion a year and accounts for about 8% of all international trade. The American government maintains that there is no alternative but to vigorously prosecute their zero tolerance policy of arresting drug users and their dealers. This has led to the incarceration of over 500,000 Americans. Meanwhile the flood of illegal drugs into America continues unabated. One thing the American government has not done is to prosecute the largest banks in the world for supporting the drug cartels by washing billions of dollars of their blood stained money. As Narco sphere journalist Bill Conroy has observed banks are ”where the money is” in the global drug war. HSBC, Western Union, Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase&Co, Citigroup, Wachovia amongst many others have allegedly failed to comply with American anti-money laundering (AML) laws. The Mexican drug cartels have caught the headlines again and again due to their murderous activities. The war between the different drug cartels and the war between the cartels and government security forces has spilled the blood of tens of thousands of innocent people. The drug cartels would find it much harder to profit from their murderous activity if they didn’t have too big to fail banks willing to wash their dirty money. In March 2010 Wachovia cut a deal with the US government which involved the bank being given fines of $160 million under a ”deferred prosecution” agreement. This was due to Wachovia’s heavy involvement in money laundering moving up to $378.4 billion over several years. Not one banker was prosecuted for illegal involvement in the drugs trade. Meanwhile small time drug dealers and users go to prison. If any member of the public is caught in possession of a few grammes of coke or heroin you can bet your bottom dollar they will be going down to serve some hard time. However, if you are a bankster caught laundering billions of dollars for some of the most murderous people on the planet you get off with a slap on the wrist in the form of some puny fine and a deferred prosecution deal. Charles A. Intriago, president of the Miami-based Association of Certified Financial Crime Specialists has observed, “… If you’re an individual, and get caught, you get hammered. “But if you’re a big bank, and you’re caught moving money for a terrorist or drug dealer, you don’t have to worry. You just fork over a monetary penalty, and then raise your fees to make up for it. “Until we see bankers walking off in handcuffs to face charges in these cases, nothing is going to change,” Intriago adds. “These monetary penalties are just a cost of doing business to them, like paying for a new corporate jet.” This failure on the behalf of the US government to really crack down on the finances of the drug cartels extends to British banks as well. In July 2012 the US Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs issued a 339 page report detailing an amazing catalogue of ”criminal ” behaviour by London based HSBC. This includes washing over $881 for the Mexican Sinaloa Cartel and for the Norte del Valle Cartel in Colombia. Besides this, HSBC affiliated banks such as HBUS repeatedly broke American AML laws by their long standing and severe AML deficiencies which allowed Saudi banks such as Al Rajhi to finance terrorist groups that included Al-Qaeda. HBUS the American affiliate of HSBC supplied Al Rajhi bank with nearly $1 billion in US dollars. Jack Blum an attorney and former Senate investigator has commented, “They violated every goddamn law in the book. They took every imaginable form of illegal and illicit business.” HSBC affiliate HBUS was repeatedly instructed to improve its anti-money laundering program. In 2003 the Federal Reserve Bank of New York took enforcement action that called upon HBUS to improve its anti-money laundering program. In September 2010 the Office of Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) sent a,”blistering supervisory letter” to HBUS listing numerous AML problems at the bank. In October 2010 this was followed up with the OCC issuing a cease and desist order requiring HBUS to improve its AML program a second time. Senator Carl Levin chairman of the Senate investigation into HSBC has commented that ,”HSBC’s Chief Compliance Officer and other senior executives in London knew what was going on, but allowed the deceptive conduct to continue.” Let us look at just a couple of the devastating findings in the Senate report. The main focus of the report is the multiple failures of HSBC to comply with AML laws and regulations: ”The identified problems included a once massive backlog of over 17,000 alertsidentifying possible suspicious activity that had yet to be reviewed; ineffective methods foridentifying suspicious activity; a failure to file timely Suspicious Activity Reports with U.S. law enforcement; … a 3-year failure by HBUS [a HSBC affiliate] , from mid-2006 to mid-2009, to conduct any AML monitoring of $15 billion in bulk cash transactions … a failure to monitor $60 trillion in annual wire transfer activity bycustomers …inadequate andunqualified AML staffing; inadequate AML resources; and AML leadership problems. Sincemany of these criticisms targeted severe, widespread,and long standing AML deficiencies,…..” The report catalogues in great detail the failings of HSBC affiliates HBUS in America and HMEX in Mexico: ”from 2007 through 2008, HBMX was the single largest exporter ofU.S. dollars to HBUS, shipping $7 billion in cash to HBUS over two years, outstripping larger Mexican banks and other HSBC affiliates. Mexican and U.S. authorities expressed repeated concern that HBMX’s bulk cash shipments could reach that volume only if they included illegal drug proceeds. The concern was that drug traffickers unable to deposit large amounts of cash in U.S. banks due to AML controls were transporting U.S. dollars to Mexico, arranging for bulk deposits there, and then using Mexican financial institutions to insert the cash back into the U.S. financial system. … high profile clients involved in drug trafficking; millions of dollars in suspicious bulk travelers cheque transactions; inadequate staffing and resources; and a huge backlog of accounts marked for closure due to suspicious activity, but whose closures were delayed.” In the Senate hearing on 17 July 2012 Carl Levin Chairman of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs explained how HMEX helped the Mexican drug cartels: ”Because our tough AML laws in the United States have made it hard for drug cartels to find a U.S. bank willing to accept huge unexplained deposits of cash, they now smuggle U.S. dollars across the border into Mexico and look for a Mexican bank or casa de cambio willing to take the cash. Some of those casas de cambios had accounts at HBMX. HBMX, in turn, took all the physical dollars it got and transported them by armored car or aircraft back across the border to HBUS for deposit into its U.S. banknotes account, completing the laundering cycle.” Senator Levin went on to note how: ”Over two years, from 2007 to 2008, HBMX shipped $7 billion in physical U.S. dollars to HBUS. That was more than any other Mexican bank, even one twice HBMX’s size. When law enforcement and bank regulators in Mexico and the United States got wind of the banknotes transactions, they warned HBMX and HBUS that such large dollar volumes were red flags for drug proceeds moving through the HSBC network.” In December 2012 the Department of Justice cut a deal with HSBC which imposed a record $1.9 billion dollar fine. It may sound a lot to ordinary folks but it is a tiny fraction of its annual profits which in 2011 totalled $22 billion. Assistant Attorney General Lanny Bauer announced the settlement at a press conference on 11 December 2012. His comments reveal why the US government decided to go soft on such criminal behaviour and show quite clearly how there is one law for the richest 1% and one law for the rest of us. Lenny Bauer said: ”Had the U.S. authorities decided to press criminal charges, HSBC would almost certainly have lost its banking license in the U.S., the future of the institution would have been under threat and the entire banking system would have been destabilized.”

### 3

The United States federal government should establish complete surveillance, at least including the Vehicle and Dismount Exploitation Radar, over the US-Mexico border, deploy Customs and Border Patrol in response to discovered movements across the border, substantially increase internal immigration enforcement, encourage partnership between state and local officials, and increased removals and increased use of state and local laws to discourage illegal settlement.

Increased drone surveillance solves cartel smuggling. **Becker 13**

(Andrew, “New Drone Report: Our Border Is Not as Secure as We Thought,” The Daily Beast, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/04/04/new-drone-report-our-border-is-not-as-secure-as-we-thought.html)

Thanks to a previously unreported drone flying over the U.S.-Mexico border, we now know that more people are crossing than previously thought—and getting away with it, reports Andrew Becker of the Center for Investigative Reporting. ∂ The U.S. Border Patrol has caught a fraction of the border crossers spotted by a sophisticated sensor mounted on unmanned spy aircraft and flown over remote stretches of desert, casting doubts on claims that the area is more secure than ever, according to documents obtained by the Center for Investigative Reporting.∂ SIERRA VISTA, AZ - MARCH 07: Air Interdiction Agent Will Brazelton from U.S. Office of Air and Marine (OAM), pilots Predator drone surveillance flights from a flight operations center near the Mexican border on March 7, 2013 at Fort Huachuca in Sierra Vista, Arizona. The OAM flies the unmanned - and unarmed - MQ-9 Predator B aircraft an average of 12 hours per day at around 19,000 feet over southern Arizona. The drones, piloted from the ground, search for drug smugglers and immigrants crossing illegally from Mexico into the United States. Due to federal sequestration cuts, Customs and Border Protection is expected to lose $500 million from its budget, and OAM staff at Ft. Huachuca are now taking unpaid furlough days once every two weeks as part of the cuts. (Photo by John Moore/Getty Images)∂ Will Brazelton from the U.S. Office of Air and Marine (OAM) operates a Predator drone in March from a flight-operations center near the Mexican border at Fort Huachuca in Sierra Vista, Arizona. (John Moore/Getty)∂ The border crossers were spotted with a new, all-seeing radar system developed for use in the Afghanistan War and patrolling above the U.S.-Mexico border in parts of Arizona since March 2012. The system can reveal every man, woman, and child under its gaze from a height of about 25,000 feet.∂ Between October and December, records show, the remotely operated aircraft detected 7,333 border crossers during its Arizona missions. Border Patrol agents, however, reported 410 apprehensions during that time, according to an internal agency report. The sensor was credited with providing surveillance that led to 52 arrests and 15,135 pounds of seized marijuana.∂ Dubbed VADER (Vehicle and Dismount Exploitation Radar) and conjuring images of the Star Wars villain, the sensor can cover a wide swath of land and follow movement as it happens. The system, which is on loan from the U.S. Army, is used to identify roadside bombers in war zones.∂ Customs and Border Protection officials, who aim to buy two systems for the agency, have touted the system’s effectiveness and testified before Congress that it is changing the Border Patrol’s long-term strategy on securing the border. Yet its unique abilities could shine an uncomfortable light on the agency’s ability to effectively patrol the border.∂ The radar system is providing the Border Patrol with an important snapshot to judge what it calls “situational awareness”—what’s actually happening at the border. But it has left the agency grappling to measure its own success and define “security.”∂ Using the system, remote operators can track vehicles and people on foot in real time and distinguish humans from animals. The technology allows the aircraft to fly above bad weather or dust storms that otherwise might ground it, while it sends signals to ground stations that display the human targets as moving dots or black-and-white images.∂ The internal Customs and Border Protection intelligence report outlines several limitations of the system, including the obvious—it can’t tell the difference between a U.S. citizen and noncitizen. On-the-ground video and other sensors are sometimes needed to confirm these so-called nefarious tracks.∂ And simply identifying someone crossing the border is just the first step. On the ground, Border Patrol agents often are not available to respond because of rugged terrain or other assignments. As a result, thousands of people have slipped through. At the Border Patrol, they’re known as “gotaways.”∂ In one week in January, for instance, the sensor detected 355 “dismounts,” or on-foot movement, on the U.S. side of the border in Arizona. Border Patrol agents caught 125 of those, about 35 percent, while an additional 141 people evaded apprehension and 87 more turned back south to Mexico. Two were unaccounted for. The sensor detections led to more than 1,100 pounds of seized drugs.∂ VADER “has proven to be an extremely effective system in countering threats and supporting the ground commander’s mission in theater,” Boomer Rizzo, a Department of the Army civilian who helps run the radar program, said in an email. “This sensor can track smaller and slower moving targets that traditional radar systems are not able to effectively operate against.”∂ As for whether the system’s effectiveness has highlighted failures with the nation’s border security, Customs and Border Protection spokesman Michael Friel said the technology is still being tested and its accounting is being refined.∂ The initial approach used to count who is caught and who evades arrest after VADER detections “was flawed and reflected an incomplete picture of border enforcement,” he said. “There is no silver bullet in border technology.”∂ “The border is more secure than ever? Well, that’s a pretty low bar.”∂ Specifically, the agency hadn’t accounted for apprehensions once the unmanned spy plane was no longer patrolling the area or ones made out of its view, he said.∂ As Congress once again takes up immigration reform, Obama administration officials and others have pointed to the lowest levels of unauthorized border crossers—as measured by Border Patrol apprehensions—and plummeting crime statistics on the U.S. side as proof that their methods are working.∂ Conservatives have long said that immigration reform cannot come before the border is secure. Immigration-reform supporters, while acknowledging the political need for border security, say the flood of migrants is a symptom rather than a root cause of complex problems now being addressed by Congress.∂ Amid this debate, unauthorized border traffic has picked up in recent months in some parts of the country. In the Rio Grande Valley sector in South Texas, apprehensions jumped to 97,762 last year, an increase of 65 percent from the previous year, according to internal records.∂ Some border experts speculate that more immigrants, particularly from Central America, are crossing in recent months because of excitement about an expected immigration-law overhaul, federal budget cuts, and the recent release of detained immigrants by Immigration and Customs Enforcement.∂ “The border is more secure than ever? Well, that’s a pretty low bar,” said Michael Nicley, who retired in 2007 as the Border Patrol’s sector chief in Tucson, Arizona. “Border Patrol agents would be the first to stick out their chests and say the border is under control. That’s not what they’re saying. Agents I talk to down here say we’re getting hammered.”∂ Another recent Border Patrol report offers more insights into what VADER detects and how that information passes from one shift of on-duty agents to the next. The March report highlights various sensor detections—from groups of fewer than 10 to more than 100 south of the border. One group of nearly 20 wore booties to disguise its tracks. More than eight hours after VADER spotted them, they were labeled outstanding and passed to the next shift.∂ Originally designed for war zone∂ Defense contractor Northrop Grumman, based in the Washington, D.C., area, developed VADER for the U.S. Army to counter roadside bombs and other improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Afghanistan by detecting enemy combatants as they planted the weapons.∂ The program was launched in 2006 with sponsorship from the Pentagon’s research arm, known as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), to create and test a new radar system within two years. In total, Northrop Grumman has won about $188 million in related contracts, according to a review of contracting data by the Center for Investigative Reporting.∂ The Army announced in February that it was awarding a sole-source contract to Northrop Grumman for continued support of two VADER systems in Afghanistan and a third in the continental United States through the end of the year. Northrop Grumman referred questions to the U.S. Army, which said information about the domestic use of the system should come from the Department of Homeland Security.∂ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, meanwhile, has been involved with the development and testing of the system for years.∂ In 2009, the system was deployed along a 31-mile portion of the Arizona border with Mexico over five days using a Customs and Border Protection unmanned aircraft, according to a 2011 National Research Council report. The demonstration was “a great success” as the system identified suspicious activities four out of five nights, the report states.∂ Mark Borkowski, a Customs and Border Protection official, testified before a 2011 House panel of lawmakers that the system demonstrated “significant potential” for helping the agency.∂ Legislators, in turn, have supported the technology with public statements and budget earmarks totaling millions of dollars. Rep. Candice Miller (R-Michigan), who leads a House subcommittee on border and maritime security, said in a June hearing that she was “very encouraged” by VADER.∂ “This tool is extremely valuable as CBP seeks to identify and detect changing smuggling patterns,” she said.

State and local enforcement is a force-multiplier---independently solves drug revenues. **Vaughan 6**

(Jessica, “Attrition Through Enforcement,” CIS, http://cis.org/Enforcement-IllegalPopulation)

Rationale. Despite the recent growth in funding for the Department of Homeland Security and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), its enforcement arm, the agency remains hopelessly out-manned, with fewer than 10,000 immigration enforcement agents and investigators dedicated to locating and apprehending some of the more than 11 million illegal aliens residing throughout the country. A large share of these agents perform support tasks such as processing and transporting detainees, and so are not actively involved in the identification and capture of illegal aliens. It would take a huge infusion of funding and personnel for ICE to single-handedly manage this workload effectively so as to bring about a noticeable reduction in the size of the illegal alien population.∂ The law does not anticipate or require that the job be done single-handedly by ICE. Hundreds of thousands of police officers, sheriffs, and state troopers across the country regularly encounter illegal aliens in the course of their daily routine, and these officers also have the authority to arrest illegal aliens. After taking illegal aliens into custody, police officers are to inform federal immigration authorities and turn over the alien for further processing, if appropriate.40 In some cases, DHS will respond and take custody of aliens. Yet many police departments complain that DHS often refuses, citing higher priorities. Typical is this reaction: "We’re not driving hours inland to pick up illegal aliens when we’re trying to stop terrorists and weapons of mass destruction," said Rich Nemitz, the agent in charge of the Port Huron (Mich.) Border Patrol Station, which was asked to take custody of several illegal aliens identified by the Saginaw police force.41∂ Further complicating matters, some jurisdictions have so-called "sanctuary" policies in place, which forbid police officers from questioning individuals about their immigration status. Other jurisdictions cite concerns that any police involvement with federal immigration authorities will sow fear of authorities in immigrant communities.∂ At the national level, ICE has merely tolerated rather than encouraged involvement from state and local law enforcement, and the enforcement statistics reflect this ambivalence, with only a very small fraction of the resident illegal population apprehended and removed each year (fewer than 100,000 removals of longer-term illegal residents, or about 1 percent of the total illegal population in 2004).42∂ ICE could become far more productive in terms of apprehensions and removals if it more actively cultivated partnerships with those state and local law enforcement departments that wish to participate in immigration law enforcement. These partnerships have proved to be mutually beneficial; in addition to helping ICE, they also give local police another law enforcement tool to use in addressing local criminal problems, such as gangs and drugs.

Increasing border enforcement solves. **Dickson 14**

[Caitlin, 7/9, The Daily Beast, How Mexico’s Cartels Are Behind the Border Kid Crisis. [online] Available at: http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/06/23/how-mexico-s-cartels-are-behind-the-border-kid-crisis.html [Accessed 28 Jun. 2015].

“We have grave concerns that dangerous cartel activity, including narcotics smuggling and human trafficking, will go unchecked because Border Patrol resources are stretched too thin,” Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott wrote in a letter to Department of Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson this month, requesting $30 million for additional law enforcement. Recent U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration statistics back this theory. Total marijuana, cocaine, heroin and methamphetamine seizures between January 1 and June 14 of this year have dropped across all states that line the U.S.-Mexico border, but the decrease in Texas—the center of the surge in unaccompanied minors—has been bigger than the average, at 34 percent. The DEA and Border Patrol have said it’s too soon to tell whether the decrease in drug seizures is at all connected to the increase in underage crossers.

Terrorists are using the southwest border, specifically rural areas – CP solves the advantage. **Theobald 15**

Theobald 15 (Bill, Staff Writer at USA Today, “Southwest border not secure, locals tell committee,” 3/17/2015, ProQuest)

WASHINGTON -- People living and working in Arizona and other border states told Senate lawmakers Tuesday **the U.S.-Mexico boundary isn't secure. Witnesses at the hearing** before the the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee **said that must change** before Congress considers immigration reform. Mark **Daniels**, the sheriff in Cochise County, Ariz., **told committee members violence along the border continues to escalate. "**The rural parts of the border are not secure," he said. He said previous **federal efforts have focused on populated areas, pushing more of the illegal activity** -- border crossings and drug-smuggling -- **to rural areas like his county**. "We are a product of the federal government's plan," Daniels said. Mexican **traffickers have become more sophisticated and innovative** in getting drugs across the border, Daniels said in written testimony. **They use ultra-light aircraft that aren't detected by radar**, vehicles that look like they belong to law enforcement, and even catapults that launch bundles of marijuana across the border. Citing the discovery of a tunnel underneath the border, Daniels said he fears **terrorists could cross into the U.S.** "If you can bring drugs through, you can bring terrorists through," he said. Daniels said he has implemented several local programs to improve border security, including buying additional communication equipment and creating a ranch patrol. Chris Cabrera, a Border Patrol agent testifying on behalf of the 16,500 agents represented by the National Border Patrol Council, said he estimates only 35-40 percent of illegal immigrants are caught crossing the border, despite estimates of 75 percent from Customs and Border Protection officials. "I want to be crystal clear -- **the border is not secure**," he said. He said agents who report more than 20 illegal border-crossers at a given spot, based on counting footprints, are punished and learn to keep their counts artificially lower. "I raise this issue with you because before we can start to address our problems, we have to acknowledge the extent of them," Cabrera said. Committee Chairman Sen. Ron Johnson, R-Wis., said lack of reliable information is a top problem in dealing with border security. "**There is no solid way to track illegal flow at our border**," he said. Cabrera recommended hiring 5,000 more border agents, thinning out the layers of management within the Border Patrol, and improving the training of agents. Also testifying was Howard Buffett, son of billionaire investor Warren Buffett, who owns 2,375 acres of ranchland along the border in Cochise County. **Congress should strengthen border security** separately from reforming immigration, Buffett said. "**Our insecure border creates a serious humanitarian crisis"** by encouraging people to try illegal crossings and allowing drug cartels to operate, he told lawmakers. In a related development Tuesday, Arizona Republican Sen. John McCain and Arizona Republican Rep. Matt Salmon introduced companion bills that would give Customs and Border Protection agents full access to federal lands on Arizona's southwest border. Currently, agents must receive permission from federal agencies to conduct routine patrols. The Arizona Borderlands Protection and Preservation Act was co-sponsored in the Senate by GOP Sen. Jeff Flake and in the House by Arizona Republican Reps. Trent Franks, Paul Gosar, Martha McSally, and David Schweikert.

## Case

### Cartels

Pot is key to Sinaloa and Tijuana cartels, the most powerful and influential cartels. **Murray 11**

Chad Murray 11, M.A. student in the Latin American and Hemispheric Studies Program @ George Washington, supervised and sponsored by the OAS and Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission, “Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations and Marijuana: The Potential Effects of U.S. Legalization”, 4/26/11, https://elliott.gwu.edu/sites/elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/acad/lahs/mexico-marijuana-071111.pdf

While Los Zetas and La Familia have recently dominated the media coverage of the drug war in Mexico, they might not be objectively termed the strongest cartels in the country. They are the most active in attacking government forces and setting up narco bloqueos in major cities.59 However, they do not have the financial strength, military prowess, territorial reach, or tactical discipline of Mexico‟s largest DTO, the Sinaloa cartel. 60 This DTO and the Tijuana cartel are major traffickers of marijuana, and their territories are the major marijuana production areas in Mexico. They have near exclusive control of the so called “Golden Triangle” region of Mexico where the mountainous areas of Sinaloa, Durango and Chihuahua states meet. This makes sense, because according to sources in the Drug Enforcement Agency these two DTOs likely make a majority their revenue from marijuana.¶ The amount of marijuana trafficked by the Sinaloa cartel is evident by the scale of recent drug busts. In October of 2010 Mexican police and military forces seized more than 134 metric tons of marijuana in one Sinaloa facility. This was equal to almost $200 million according to Mexican authorities.63 The very next month 30 tons of marijuana was retrieved by law enforcement on both sides of the border after a Tijuana drug smuggling tunnel was discovered.64 The DTO behind this operation has not been determined, but based on the location it is likely to be either the Sinaloa cartel or Arello Felix Organization. These seizures represent only a proportion of the amount marijuana trafficked into the United States from Mexico through the San Diego-Tijuana corridor in 2 months. There are other drug transport corridors that likely receive more marijuana traffic. ¶ Although the Sinaloa cartel does not often target civilians, it is the most violent DTO in terms of overall casualties. It has targeted hundreds of police officers and its leader, “El Chapo” Guzmán, is widely thought to have caused a recent upsurge in violence after breaking a truce with the other major criminal groups in the country.66 The feud between the Sinaloa and Juarez organizations is the reason that Juarez is the most violent city in Mexico, and according to some accounts, the entire world. 67 The Sinaloa cartel’s huge financial resources make it a major threat to the government, because they are able to corrupt large numbers of local, state, and federal government officials. This was revealed in several high profile cases in recent years.68The Sinaloa cartel is constantly trying to expand its territory into that traditionally held by other cartels, particularly in Juarez, and this is a major cause of much of the violence.¶ The Sinaloa cartel has the greatest capacity to wage „all-out war‟ because they have far more money than the other DTOs. Guzmán is also more focused on winning the favor and tacit protection of the populace, and thus is more involved in the drugs trade than kidnapping, and prefers to bribe rather than confront authorities.69 However, in many ways this makes the Sinaloa cartel more dangerous to the Government in Mexico. Its use of bribes can make local state and even federal law enforcement unreliable. Furthermore, the Sinaloa organization’s outreach to the civilian population makes it even harder for the government to gain information about Guzmán. In addition, the massive strength of the Sinaloa cartel makes an eventual peace all the more allusive. In the event that the government would try to reduce the violence through talks with cartels, the Sinaloa organization would be unlikely to take them seriously. The government has little to offer big organizations like Sinaloa, which already enjoy near uncontested control over the areas in which they operate.¶ The Tijuana cartel is also a powerful, though often underrated organization. This group was infamous in 2008 and 2009, when it destabilized much of Tijuana with its attacks on the police and rival cartels. 71As with the Sinaloa cartel, the Tijuana cartel is a very important organization with networks mainly in the Tijuana and the San Diego area. This DTO is famous for both its violence and the brutality. Most notoriously, Teodoro García Simental’s war for control of Tijuana led to hundreds being tortured and killed until his arrest in 2010. ¶ The main areas where the Sinaloa and Tijuana cartels tend to cultivate marijuana include Sonora, Michoacán, and Sinaloa states. They focus on trafficking in marijuana because it is easy to grow, profitable for wholesale, and cheap to pay laborers. In 2010 farmers received only 15 to 20 dollars for a pound of marijuana. 73 This price is just barely above the amount farmers could get for corn and other produce. Therefore, if the price farmers were to be paid for marijuana were to fall much further, it is not unlikely that many would turn to more legitimate crops.¶ These cartels represent a huge part of the Mexican organized criminal structure. Dealing a major blow to these groups could give the Mexican government a leg up. The Sinaloa cartel currently has the ability, due to its huge monetary reserves, to project its influence and carry out violence acts across vast swathes of Mexico. The Tijuana cartel holds large parts of its namesake city through violence and coercion. The following chapter will explore what effect, if any, the legalization of marijuana would have on the revenue, operational capacities, overall strength, and ability to wage violence for these two cartels.

Hezbollah is getting evicted from Latin America—no crime/terror connection anymore. **Algemeiner 15**

“Hezbollah’s ‘Golden Days’ in Latin America Coming to an End, Expert Says” http://www.algemeiner.com/2015/01/06/hezbollahs-golden-days-in-latin-america-coming-to-an-end-expert-says/

The rapidly changing diplomatic and political circumstances in Latin America mean that “Hezbollah’s golden days” in the region are coming to an end, an expert on the Lebanese Islamist terrorist organization has asserted.¶ Writing on the NOW-Lebanon website, journalist Ana Maria Luca observed that “things are changing drastically in the region. The late President Hugo Chavez, America’s most ostentatious enemy in the region, is gone. The times when Hezbollah members got Venezuelan papers to travel to the United States and Canada are probably over. Cuba — another country warmly disposed towards Iran, has recently seen an unprecedented thawing of relations with the US.”¶ Luca noted that Hezbollah was perturbed by the thawing of US-Cuba relations announced last month by President Obama. “This is how Hezbollah’s international relations official, Ammar Mousawi, congratulated Cuba,” she wrote. “‘The achievements of Cuba, which was firm in its principles, are a lesson for all peoples of the world who suffer from American hegemony,’ calling on the regime in Havana to ‘thwart the political, economic and military siege of Washington against Cuba for over half a century.’”¶ Luca’s observations were provoked by a report in the leading Brazilian daily, O Globo, which linked Hezbollah with Primer Commando de la Capital (PCC,) a criminal gang that operates across Brazil. “Intelligence services in Brazil believed that there were Hezbollah members in the country who were connected to Brazilian criminal gangs, providing weapons and explosives for the Brazilian criminals. In exchange, the Lebanese got protection for Lebanese inmates in PCC-controlled Brazilian prisons,” she said.¶ The revelation of Hezbollah’s Brazilian connection came on top of earlier investigations, reports and allegations of cooperation with the Mexican Los Zetas cartel, Luca said. “The documents, leaked by the Brazilian police to the press, show an interesting political shift in national and regional politics,” she asserted.¶ Hezbollah’s murky network in Latin America, which depends on friendly governments such as the leftist regimes in Venezuela and Bolivia, has been under scrutiny since 2006, when the US Treasury Department raised the matter with several Latin American governments. Almost ten years later, according to Luca, Hezbollah can no longer rely on intelligence agencies and police forces “turning a blind eye.”

Status quo solves Hezbollah—the conflict in Syria has overstretched them and will force military restraint. **Byman & Saab 15**

Daniel Byman, Research Director, Center for Middle East Policy, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East Policy, Bilal Y. Saab, Resident Senior Fellow for Middle East Security, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, January 21, 2015, Brookings Institution, “Hezbollah Hesitates? The Group's Uncertain Transformation” http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2015/01/21-hezbollah-threat-byman-saab

Israel’s killing this week of six Hezbollah fighters and a top Iranian general in a helicopter raid in Syria is the latest and boldest attack by the Jewish state against the Shia party in recent years. Hezbollah has vowed to retaliate, and many of its supporters, urging the party to respond swiftly and forcefully, have advised Israel to “prepare its shelters.” If the three-decade history of confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah is any guide, the latter is likely to strike back to protect its credibility. But that is not inevitable. The Syrian conflict has transformed Hezbollah, arguably turning it into a more cautious foe of the Jewish state.¶ Hezbollah is a survivor. Since its formation in the early 1980s, the Shia party has made it through three high-intensity military conflicts with Israel, the assassination of several of its top leaders, the departure of its Syrian patron from Lebanon in 2005, and significant political crises in Beirut. Power, money, and performance, chiefly enabled by Iran and Syria, have allowed Hezbollah to become the dominant group in Lebanon and a key player in the high politics of the Middle East.¶ But the Syrian civil war is challenging Hezbollah’s domestic and regional position. If Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime falls, Hezbollah would lose a key supporter from a country that historically has played a dominant role in Lebanese politics. Even more important, Syria is Iran’s closest ally, and Tehran was calling in its chits by asking Hezbollah to close ranks around the Assad regime. Should Syria fall, Hezbollah could lose a storage facility and transit route for weapons from Iran and Syria to Lebanon. But should Assad leave, or his jihadist opponents grow stronger, the gravest threat Hezbollah (and Lebanon as a whole) would have to imminently deal with is Sunni extremism as represented by groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Sunni radicals would not settle for controlling Syria. They would also seek to expand into Lebanon to go after their number one bogeyman, Hezbollah. Already, Sunni jihadists have struck Hezbollah targets and the Iranian embassy in Lebanon, among other places.¶ By intervening in Syria to come to Assad’s aid, Hezbollah’s chief Hassan Nasrallah has put his party on a collision course with Syria’s (and many of the region’s) Sunnis—moderate and extremist alike. Indeed, despite Hezbollah’s military advances in Syria, Sunni militants have been able to penetrate deep into the Shia party’s sphere of influence and wreak havoc. More important, the same extremists that Nasrallah was hoping to fight outside Lebanon could turn Lebanon into another Iraq, a country defined by Sunni-Shia sectarian violence. Another Lebanese civil war would be a major distraction from the military struggle against Israel.¶ Hezbollah also risks military setbacks. Hezbollah has beaten back Israel’s military from Lebanon, earning it healthy respect from Israeli military leaders, something conspicuously lacking for other Arab military forces. At any given moment, there are perhaps 5,000 Hezbollah soldiers in Syria, but Hezbollah regularly rotates its forces to limit the impact. Even so, the strain is showing. Because of its heavy role in Syria, Hezbollah is more militarily invested in Iran than ever before. In Syria, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force assisted Hezbollah with command-and-control and training. Entering the war was in part payback for past favors, but the move tied Hezbollah even more tightly to its Iranian master. Finally, Hezbollah believes that it has a military role in Lebanon because of Syria. Along the border, its forces cooperate quietly with the Lebanese Armed Forces, patrolling and even laying mines to prevent infiltration.¶ Hezbollah is both battle weary and battle hardened. The Syria experience has bloodied its forces, making them more skilled and allowing Hezbollah to test its commanders. At the same time, the heavy death toll and the constant strain are overwhelming, and Hezbollah could not easily take on a new foe. The fighting in Syria is also different from fighting Israel: Hezbollah is, in essence, a counterinsurgency force, taking on less-organized, poorly trained, and lightly-armed rebels. The Israel Defense Forces are a different, and far more dangerous, kettle of fish.¶ As a result, Hezbollah’s military threat to Israel is uncertain. The growing range of Hezbollah’s rockets puts all of Israel in danger, although the success of the “Iron Dome” missile defense system offers Israelis some comfort. Nevertheless, Hezbollah is in no mood for an all-out war with Israel. The memories of the disastrous 2006 conflict are still fresh, and the drain of the Syrian conflict makes Hezbollah even more cautious. Although Israel likewise has no interest in a broad fight, conflict might break out depending on how Hezbollah chooses to respond to Israel’s latest deadly assault.¶ Despite Hezbollah’s role in terrorism, the United States and Hezbollah currently share many interests—a reality both sides hate and would deny. Yet both are at war with ISIS, and both want to prop up Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar Abadi’s government in Baghdad. Even within Lebanon, although Washington supports Hezbollah’s weak political rivals, it recognizes that Hezbollah is helping hold the country together and that an ISIS expansion or a descent into chaos would be a nightmare.¶ A slight shift could turn suspicion into conflict. U.S. military actions in Syria are focused on ISIS and thus are indirectly helping the Assad regime, Hezbollah’s ally. Yet if Washington decides to live up to its anti-Assad rhetoric and take on the Syrian regime as well as ISIS, it will also be taking on Hezbollah. Similarly, Hezbollah is more in bed with Iran now than ever before, and any military action against Tehran over its nuclear program must factor in the Hezbollah response.¶ Hezbollah remains a potent regional actor: a stalking horse for Iran, and a prop to the Syrian regime. Nevertheless, the organization is also overtaxed militarily and on the defensive politically. Therefore, as painful as the loss it has just suffered is, it wouldn’t be shocking if Hezbollah decided to hold fire, or at least limit its response.

Poverty is an alt cause to cartels. **Ramsey 11**

Ramsey, Washington Office on Latin America’s Digital Communications Officer, 2011 (Geoffrey, former researcher for the Open Society Foundation’s Latin America Program, Masters Degree in International Affairs, July 20th, Poverty a Recruitment Tool for Mexico's Criminal Gangs, InSight Crime, <http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/poverty-a-recruitment-tool-for-mexicoscriminal-gangs>,)

While there are several likely explanations for this phenomenon, most analysts agree that Mexico’s abysmal youth unemployment rate is a major contributing factor. As Victor Clark-Alfaro, director of the Binational Center for Human Rights in Tijuana, recently told Reuters, organized crime has become a “job provider” for those in the country with little alternative means of employment. According to Clark-Alfaro, "Since 2000, the age at which people start getting mixed up in organized crime has fallen, and in the last few years, the age has dropped to about 17 or 18." Recently, Mexico’s Assistant Secretary of Education Rodolfo Tuiran claimed that there are an estimated 7.3 million Mexicans between the ages of 12 and 29 who are unemployed and are not in school, which amounts to more than 20 percent of the country’s youth population. Despite the fact that these “ni-nis” (so labeled because they neither study or work, "ni estudian ni trabajan") are widely dismissed as simply lazy by many in Mexico, evidence suggests that this trend is due to a serious lack of investment in social programs at the state level. Diana Carbajosa Martínez, a researcher at the National Autonomous University of Mexico’s (Universidad Nacional Autonomo de Mexico) Research Institute on Universities and Education, told El Universal that only five states offer social programs specifically targeting this issue: Chihuahua, Baja California, Tlaxcala, Guerrero and Hidalgo. Meanwhile, the two states with the highest numbers of jobless youths are Chiapas and Michoacan, and the complete lack of such programs there puts youth unemployment at more than 25 percent. As InSight Crime has reported, Mexican President Felipe Calderon has been repeatedly criticized for his security strategy, which many believe prioritizes capturing and killing cartel leaders, known as “high value targets.” Instead, these critics, who have largely joined under the banner of Mexico’s “peace movement,” argue for a more comprehensive approach to Mexico’s security crisis, with an emphasis on the socioeconomic factors which influence crime. This argument has largely fallen on deaf ears, as Calderon and others have pointed out that addressing poverty and inequality will do nothing to impact the illicit narcotics industry, which is estimated to rake in around $40 billion a year. While this may be true, it is difficult to make the case that Calderon’s strategy has actually resulted in increased security in the country, considering that killings related to organized crime are up by 16 percent this year.

Marijauan legalization is killing cartels now – they can’t keep up with pricing or quality. **Ingraham 3/8**

Christopher Ingraham, Legal marijuana is finally doing what the drug war couldn’t, March 3, 2016

Legal marijuana may be doing at least one thing that a decades-long drug war couldn't: taking a bite out of Mexican drug cartels' profits. The latest data from the U.S. Border Patrol shows that last year, marijuana seizures along the southwest border tumbled to their lowest level in at least a decade. Agents snagged roughly 1.5 million pounds of marijuana at the border, down from a peak of nearly 4 million pounds in 2009. The data supports the many stories about the difficulties marijuana growers in Mexico face in light of increased competition from the north. As domestic marijuana production has ramped up in places such as California, Colorado and Washington, marijuana prices have fallen, especially at the bulk level. "Two or three years ago, a kilogram [2.2 pounds] of marijuana was worth $60 to $90," a Mexican marijuana grower told NPR news in December 2014. "But now they're paying us $30 to $40 a kilo. It's a big difference. If the U.S. continues to legalize pot, they'll run us into the ground." And it's not just price — Mexican growers are facing pressure on quality, too. "The quality of marijuana produced in Mexico and the Caribbean is thought to be inferior to the marijuana produced domestically in the United States or in Canada," the DEA wrote last year in its 2015 National Drug Threat Assessment. "Law enforcement reporting indicates that Mexican cartels are attempting to produce higher-quality marijuana to keep up with U.S. demand." If the decline in border seizures is any indication, however, it appears that Mexican growers are having difficulty competing with domestic production. Some federal authorities are beginning to believe this is the case. Noting the decline in border seizures, Michael Botticelli, director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, told a Senate committee last year that "given the increase in marijuana use among the American population, this suggests that people using marijuana in the United States may be increasingly obtaining marijuana from domestic sources."

Terminal D – the cartels don’t use handguns and they ship gun parts to be assembled in Mexico, not whole guns, you ban the wrong thing. **Schatz 16**

Bryan Schatz, How a Loophole in US Law Helps Drug Cartels Sneak Guns Into Mexico, Jan. 12, 2016

The cartels' weapons of choice are high-caliber rifles\*, as well as AR-15 and AK-47-type semiautomatic rifles, which can be easily converted into fully automatic machine guns. The cartel's gunrunners often buy firearms legally in the United States, either at gun shops, gun shows, or in private sales. The firearms are then illegally shipped across the border. But increasingly, the cartels are shipping weapons parts into Mexico to be assembled into finished firearms. It's a discreet process that is especially difficult to detect. Firearm manufacturers or importers in the United States are not required to stamp serial numbers on gun parts. Retailers do not have to report when they buy and sell parts kits with everything needed to complete a gun except a receiver. Receivers, which house the mechanical components of a firearm, like trigger groups and magazine feeds, can be purchased separately. To avoid detection, gunrunners will often use unfinished, or "80-percent" receivers—receivers that are mostly complete but require some further machining to be functional.

The USFG is the one supplying all the guns, not private owners. **Farago 15**

Robert Farago, 28k U.S. Assault Rifles Headed for Mexican Drug Cartels?, June 9, 2015

Mexico has purchased more than $1.15 billion in military equipment from the United States over the past 12 months. As the following article [via borderlandbeat.com] reports, “These sales do not include guns and ammunition. In 2014, the U.S. legally transferred more than 28,000 firearms to Mexico, most of them military rifles, at a value of $21.6 million. The year saw the most firearms sales in dollars of the 15 years that the U.S. Census Bureau has kept data.” Accountability? You must be joking. In fact, over the last ten years . . . thousands of U.S.-made rifles have “seeped” from the Mexican military to the drug cartels. More than 55k military-trained personnel defected to the cartels. Thousands more fully-automatic firearms simply went walkies from military and police arsenals. Not to mention the fact that the Mexican drug cartels have billions of dollars to spend on the tens of thousands of guns that the U.S. has sold or “donated” to South American countries over the last few decades. Or guns imported from China, Europe and elsewhere. When confiscated by the Mexican military, none of these official U.S. sales rifles are submitted to the ATF for trace. Why would they? They’re stamped with the original owner’s ID. Anyway, if just 10 percent of last year’s official U.S. rifle sales end up in cartels hands, a low-ball estimate, that’s 2800 box fresh guns. Remember: the U.S. is hardly the only country selling guns to the Mexican government, which quickly find their way into cartel hands. The feds would have you believe that Bob’s Gun Store is supplying the Mexican drug cartels with weaponry. The article tries to back that up with a University of San Diego study claiming 250k guns flow from the U.S. to Mexico illegally per year, I call bull. Our criminal neighbors to the South – which includes Mexican police and military – are awash in guns. Anyone who thinks that Uncle Sam isn’t the primary provider, one way or another, is failing to see the forest from the trees. Intentionally.

Alt cause - Germany sells guns to mexico. **Wells 13**

Miriam Wells, Germany Arms Firm Illegally Sold Weapons to Mexico, 07 May 2013

A German arms manufacturer has admitted to illegally selling thousands of rifles to Mexico, where the weapons were reportedly used to commit human rights violations. Heckler & Koch, which produces weapons such as pistols, machine guns, and grenade launchers, is under investigation by German authorities for exporting G36 rifles to several Mexican states where Germany prohibits gun sales, due to human rights concerns. The company previously claimed it had only ever delivered weapons to Mexico's central weapons authority run by the defense ministry. However, this week the company admited to the illegal exports. There were "strong suspicions" that two employees had sent rifles to the forbidden states without approval, the company said in statement, adding that the pair had since been fired. Over 9,000 illegal G36 rifles were reportedly sold to Mexico in total. Mexico's Secretary of Defense has said that nearly half of these rifles ended up in the four states where Germany prohibits arms sales.

Mexico doesn't get guns from the US and gun regulation alone won’t help unless the Mexican military steps up. Prefer our ev – it accounts for the flaws in your studies. **Mauro 11**

Ryan Mauro, WHERE DRUG CARTELS REALLY GET THEIR ARMS, April 18, 2011

The Mexican government and the media have consistently blamed the U.S. for the vicious drug war in Mexico that has resulted in over 35,000 deaths since late 2006. A diplomatic cable released by Wikileaks will disappoint them, as it shows that 90 percent of the heavy weapons used by the drug cartels come from Central America. The strength of the drug cartels is more attributable to the Mexican government’s inefficiencies than America’s gun laws or consumption of narcotics. According to the published documents, U.S. diplomats in Mexico believe that these weapons, such as grenades and rocket launchers, are being stolen from the armed forces of Central American countries. They arrive in Mexico via the 577-mile Guatemalan border that only 125 Mexican immigration officials guard. Hezbollah and the Colombian FARC terrorist groups also deserve blame, as there are increasing indications that they are in bed with the drug cartels and are providing them with training, financing and possibly arms. Other cables show that U.S. diplomats are frustrated with Mexico’s handling of the drug war. The army is said to be so risk-averse that it declines to act on intelligence provided by the U.S. One document dated November 9, 2009 written by U.S. Ambassador Carlos Pascual says, “Mexico’s use of strategic and tactical intelligence is often fractured, ad hoc, and heavily reliant on the United States for leads and operations.” The responsibility for the failure to tame the escalating drug war lies with Mexico, as no U.S. gun restriction can disarm the drug lords when the Mexican army is unwilling or unable to fight. These documents are unlikely to stop the blaming of the U.S. for the war in Mexico. Secretary of State Clinton said on March 25, 2009, “Our insatiable demand for illegal drugs fuels the drug trade.” The media constantly cites the dubious claim 90 percent of the guns used by the drug lords come from the United States. This statistic comes from a report by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. It is based on the fact that, of the 29,000 guns seized in 2007 and 2008, 6,000 were sent to the U.S. for tracing. Of these, 90 percent were indeed found to have come from the U.S. But there is much more behind this fuzzy statistic.

Pena-Nieto administration crackdown has already eliminated the biggest cartel threats and ensured government stability

GUERRERO 14— (EDUARDO, “Yes: Violence and Murder Are Decreasing in Mexico,” Americas Quarterly, FALL 2014, <http://www.americasquarterly.org/content/yes-violence-and-murder-are-decreasing-mexico>).

When Mexican President Felipe Calderón left office in 2012, the nation’s war on the drug cartels had already claimed 60,000 lives. Now, two years into the presidency of his successor, Enrique Peña Nieto, security conditions are still far from praiseworthy, but have improved in several key areas.Homicides, the most reliable indicator for measuring public security in Mexico, have steadily decreased over the past two years. According to Mexico’s Insituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (National Institute of Statistics and Geography—INEGI) the number of murders decreased 13 percent between 2012 and 2013, and the homicide rate per 100,000 people declined from 22 to 19. Organized crime-related deaths have decreased even faster. According to the database of Lantia Consultores, a Mexico City-based public policy consulting firm, there were 1,956 organized crime-related deaths in the second quarter of 2014, down from a peak of 4,587 in the second quarter of 2011. The pace of the decline in organized crime-related deaths has been especially encouraging in two key metropolitan areas. In Ciudad Juárez, once known as the world’s most violent city, organized crime-related deaths have dropped from a peak of 787 during the third quarter of 2010 to 54 in the second quarter of 2014—a 93 percent drop. Likewise, in the Monterrey metropolitan area, Mexico’s industrial capital, murders in this category dropped from 472 in the first quarter of 2012 to 38 in the second quarter of 2014. The improvement in Monterrey seems to be the result of a thorough revamping of state and local police departments, which is largely the result of aggressive lobbying by the city’s powerful business community. This demonstrates the potential of local institution-building efforts in Mexico. Even the U.S. Department of State acknowledged as much in its August 2014 Mexico Travel Warning, which stated, “Security services in and around Monterrey are robust and have proven responsive and effective in combating violent crimes.”1 Moreover, over the past two years, peace has returned to cities throughout northern Mexico to an extent that seemed impossible between 2008 and 2012. High-profile attacks, shootings and roadblocks are less frequent. (One exception is Tamaulipas, which experienced a violent crisis as recently as last April.) Unfortunately, data for crimes other than homicide remain unreliable in Mexico. Thus, it is very hard to assess whether the downward trend in murders extends to other violent crimes, especially kidnapping and extortion, which are foremost concerns for Mexicans. The Peña Nieto administration has also recorded a number of important operational successes. The Zetas, a particularly violent cartel founded by defectors from elite military groups, have been nearly disbanded. (The decision to have federal forces target Zetas was taken at the end of the previous administration.) Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán—Mexico’s most notorious drug lord—was captured last February by Peña Nieto’s forces. His capture was skillfully executed and managed to avoid a violent conflict among factions of the Sinaloa Cartel. Some would argue that capturing such kingpins represents only a temporary setback to the cartels. However, such captures convey an important message: the Mexican state is only willing to tolerate so much violence or public notoriety, and it has the strength to prevail over drug lords. Arguably, Peña Nieto’s biggest victory thus far has been the successful operations in the state of Michoacán in early 2014, which dealt a significant blow to the Knights Templar—a drug cartel that had exercised virtually uncontested influence over political and economic activities in the state for the previous two years. Former Governor Fausto Vallejo and several mayors have acknowledged that the gang extorted protection money from almost all 113 municipal governments. A stream of recently released videos featuring mayors, state-level officials and even Vallejo’s son talking and drinking with the Knights Templar leader, Servando “La Tuta” Gómez, seem to confirm the cartel’s tight grip over local and state authorities. What made the Michoacán case particularly challenging was the emergence of armed self-defense groups in the Tierra Caliente region that organized to combat ever-increasing extortion by the Knights Templar. As the initial uprising rapidly expanded, a widespread civil conflict became a serious threat. The intervention of federal troops should have begun earlier, and was triggered only when self-defense groups were about to march on Apatzingán, the stronghold of the Knights Templar in the Tierra Caliente region, risking massive bloodshed. However, since the arrival of hundreds of federal forces in Michoacán last January, stability and security have improved. Organized crime-related deaths decreased 40 percent between the first and second quarters of 2014, and another large reduction is expected for the third quarter. Several Knights Templar leaders and some of their political associates have been arrested, avoiding an extensive witch hunt. In an effort to restore the rule of law, the federal government created the Comisión para la Seguridad y el Desarrollo Integral en el Estado de Michoacán (Commission for Security and Development in the State of Michoacán), which has displaced the state government as the key decision maker in the region. The Commission has brokered a ceasefire with most self-defense groups, many of which opted to join the ranks of a legal rural police.

Specifically, cartels are not a threat- no leadership

BBC 15— (“Mexico arrests Zetas cartel leader Omar Trevino Morales,” BBC, 5 March 2015, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-31731842>). WM

Omar Trevino Morales, leader of the notorious Zetas drugs cartel in Mexico, has been captured by security forces. He was arrested in the early hours of Wednesday in the city of Monterrey in the northern state of Nuevo Leon, police said. He is believed to have run the Zetas cartel since the capture of his brother, Miguel Angel, in 2013. The arrest comes days after Mexican police captured another suspected drug lord, Servando "La Tuta" Gomez. Servando Gomez was the leader of the Knights Templar cartel in Michoacan state. Omar Trevino Morales, known as Z-42 and believed to be 40 or 41 years old, is wanted in the US and Mexico on charges of drug trafficking, kidnap and murder. The Mexican government had a 30m peso (£1.3m; $2m) reward for his capture while the US offered a $5m (£3.2m) reward. 'Extremely violent profile' Mexican media, citing officials, said he had been seized in the Monterrey suburb of San Pedro Garza Garcia in a joint operation by the army and the federal police. He was arrested in a luxury home without a shot being fired, local media said. null Neighbours told El Universal newspaper the house had been bought about six months ago by a family "which kept themselves to themselves and did not mingle with other neighbours". He has been transferred under heavy security to Mexico City and paraded before television cameras. National Security Commission Director Monte Alejandro Rubido Garcia said intelligence gatherings since the capture of Omar Trevino's brother led to his arrest. "For the past few years, he's been one of the country's most-wanted delinquents, with an extremely violent profile," said Mr Rubido. The capture of not just one - but two - drugs kingpins in less than a week is a coup for the Mexican government. It has come in for criticism in recent months for failing to quell the violence.

### Soft Power

You shot yourself in the foot with the perception link – we signed the UN Arms Trade Treaty in 2013, the world perceives us as stopping international gun violence. **Hawkins 15**

AWR Hawkins, Obama Officials Heading to Mexico to Discuss International Gun Control Via UN Treaty, 23 Aug 2015

The ATT was signed by Secretary of State John Kerry on September 25, 2013 but never ratified by the US Senate. Nevertheless, Gun Owners of America reports that Obama officials will be in Mexico City for the conference. Breitbart News previously reported that the ATT is an international gun control treaty designed to be implemented apart from, or in spite of, the general framework of governance for countries that are signatories to it. Thus, while it will not do away with the Second Amendment on paper, it will subjugate the Second Amendment to the ATT’s gun controls if Obama administration officials return and implement the plans they will discuss in Mexico City. ATT was pushed under the guise of stopping “small arms [and] light weapons” from crossing borders. And when it was being discussed in 2013, Breitbart News warned that firearm registration must proceed from the ATT if it is to be enforceable. After all, how can agents tasked with enforcing this treaty ascertain the origin of smuggled weapons without a comprehensive registration on file? Moreover, the NRA pointed out that the treaty all but calls for a registry from the start inasmuch as it requires “importing countries to provide information to an exporting country regarding arms transfers, including ‘end use or end user documentation’ for a ‘minimum of ten years.’” This information on “end users” is not only a de-facto international gun registry but one that could be “made available to foreign governments.” Because of all these troubling aspects of ATT, Gun Owners of America (GOA) warns that the Mexico City conference is part of a plan “to bring back the framework for a global gun control regime.” GOA encourages every gun owner to call his or her US Senator and ask that they stand strong against any international gun control recommendations or regulations that the Obama administration pushes after the August 24 ATT conference.

Us soft power more likely to provoke anti-americanism among muslims – link turns your terrorism advantage. **Lynch and Singh 08**

Thomas J. Lynch & Robert S. Singh, Lecturer and Professor Foreign Policy, University of London, 2008, After Bush: the case for continuity in American foreign policy, p. 199

The tenacity with which febrile notions of American designs and influence win currency in the Islamic world is remarkable. Indeed, this should be factored into discussions of American “soft” power winning “hearts and minds.” As Bernard Lewis noted, when Khomeini and other fanatics labeled America the “Great Satan” they chose their term carefully. Satan is a seducer more than he is a warrior. It is the power to tempt “good Muslims” into a degenerate, infidel mindset and lifestyle that is the devil’s greatest threat. It is not what America does that accounts for Muslim rage. To parrot this notion as a rational explanation, demanding a change in policy that will then lead to cordial relations, is to ignore the reality that, for Islamists, what America is generates resentment, anger, and envy. It is this paradox (“Yankee go home! And take me with you!) that, among other problems, precludes the success of a “hearts and minds”-based strategy. As Lewis observed: “from the writings of Khomeini and other ideologists of Islamic fundamentalism, it is cleat that it is the seductive appeal of American culture, far more than any possible hostile acts by American governments, that they see as offering the greatest menace to the true faith and the right path as they define them. By denouncing America as the Great Satan, the late Ayatollah Khomeini was paying an unconscious tribute to that seductive appeal.” Given this, and the societal, economic, and political deficiencies that generate anti-Americanisms in the region, what can feasibly be done?

Soft power is non-governmental – attempts to increase it through policies fail and backfire. **Ellwood 14**

(David Ellwood, Senior Adjunct Professor of European Studies at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Bologna Center, 1-9-2014, "'Soft power' and the politics of influence", OUP Blog, http://blog.oup.com/2014/01/soft-power-and-the-politics-of-influence

Leaving aside its glibness and air of casuistry, the ‘soft power’ concept is fundamentally flawed at just the point where Nye insists on its usefulness: as a tool of foreign policy. The more states attempt consciously to project the force of example they see in their nations and its ways, the more the rest will see manipulation and propaganda. Two US analysts who commented on the prospects for British foreign policy in a new book (Influencing Tomorrow: Future Challenges for British Foreign Policy, 2013) were happy to say that ‘the BBC may be a more effective tool of British foreign policy than the Royal Navy or the British Army’. But they also warned against the temptations and risks of leverage: ‘when you reach for the tool of soft power, you find it evaporates in your hand’. In the American case in particular, the temptation seems to be to try to mobilise the charismatic nature of so many successful American inventions and people as though they are resources at the disposal of the state. But they are not; they are the values and products of that society in the most diffuse sense, and its creative industries in particular, with all their talent for absorbing and re-configuring the inventions of the world then re-launching them for a global market. Today the experts know that the sources of power in the world are multiplying, and that force is only one of them. Diffused through so many channels today, soft power is best seen as the influence of culture in all its forms. Nothing like culture adds value – and values – to power. The key cultural power is the one which most successfully defines the content, direction and pace of change for the rest, and so presents itself as the leading model of modernity in any given era. This was the challenge of America to the world in the 20th century. Now others have understood this lesson, and are trying to join the competition. Hopefully it’s a contest for diversity, and not for supremacy.

Soft power is useless in practice – doesn’t translate to other countries, we can’t change it, and hard power is key. **Gray 11**

(Dr. Colin S. Gray, Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, England, April 2011, "Hard Power and Soft Power: The Utility of Military Force as an Instrument of Policy in the 21st Century", Strategic Studies Institute, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/summary.cfm?q=1059#ER, DA: 7-9-2015) \*\*\*modified for potentially objectionable language

Unfortunately, although the concept of American soft power is true gold in theory, in practice it is not so valuable. Ironically, the empirical truth behind the attractive concept is just sufficient to mislead policymakers and grand strategists. Not only do Americans want to believe that the soft power of their civilization and culture is truly potent, we are all but programmed by our enculturation to assume that the American story and its values do and should have what amounts to missionary merit that ought to be universal. American culture is so powerful a programmer that it can be difficult for Americans to empathize with, or even understand, the somewhat different values and their implications held deeply abroad. The idea is popular, even possibly authoritative, among Americans that ours is not just an “ordinary country,” but instead is a country both exceptionally blessed (by divine intent) and, as a consequence, exceptionally obliged to lead Mankind [humanity]. When national exceptionalism is not merely a proposition, but is more akin to an iconic item of faith, it is difficult for usually balanced American minds to consider the potential of their soft power without rose-tinted spectacles. And the problem is that they are somewhat correct. American values, broadly speaking “the American way,” to hazard a large project in reductionism, are indeed attractive beyond America’s frontiers and have some utility for U.S. policy. But there are serious limitations to the worth of the concept of soft power, especially as it might be thought of as an instrument of policy. To date, the idea of soft power has not been subjected to a sufficiently critical forensic examination. In particular, the relation of the soft power of attraction and persuasion to the hard power of coercion urgently requires more rigorous examination than it has received thus far. When considered closely, the subject of soft power and its implications for the hard power of military force reveals a number of plausible working propositions that have noteworthy meaning for U.S. policy and strategy. 1. Hard military threat and use are more difficult to employ today than was the case in the past, in part because of the relatively recent growth in popular respect for universal humanitarian values. However, this greater difficulty does not mean that military force has lost its distinctive ability to secure some political decisions. The quality of justification required for the use of force has risen, which means that the policy domain for military relevance has diminished, but has by no means disappeared. 2. The political and other contexts for the use of force today do not offer authoritative guidance for the future. History is not reliably linear. To know the 2000s is not necessarily to know the 2010s. 3. The utility of military force is not a fixed metric value, either universally or for the United States. The utility of force varies with culture and circumstance, inter alia. It is not some free-floating objective calculable truth. 4. For both good and for ill, ethical codes are adapted and applied under the pressure of more or less stressful circumstances, and tend to be significantly situational in practice. This is simply the way things are and have always been. What a state licenses or tolerates by way of military behavior effected in its name depends to a degree on how desperate and determined are its policymakers and strategists. 5. War involves warfare, which means military force, which means violence that causes damage, injury, and death. Some of the debate on military force and its control fails to come to grips with the bloody reality, chaos, and friction that is in the very nature of warfare. Worthy and important efforts to limit conduct in warfare cannot avoid accepting the inherent nastiness of the subject. War may be necessary and it should be restrained in its conduct, but withal it is by definition illiberally violent behavior. 6. By and large, soft power should not be thought of as an instrument of policy. America is what it is, and the ability of Washington to project its favored “narrative(s)” is heavily constrained. Cultural diplomacy and the like are hugely mortgaged by foreigners’ own assessments of their interests. And a notable dimension of culture is local, which means that efforts to project American ways risk fueling “blow-back.” 7. Soft power cannot sensibly be regarded as a substantial alternative to hard military power. Familiarity with the concept alone encourages the fallacy that hard and soft power have roughly equivalent weight and utility. An illusion of broad policy choice is thus fostered, when in fact effective choices are severely constrained. 8. An important inherent weakness of soft power as an instrument of policy is that it utterly depends upon the uncoerced choices of foreigners. Sometimes their preferences will be compatible with ours, but scarcely less often they will not be. Interests and cultures do differ. 9. Soft power tends to be either so easy to exercise that it is probably in little need of a policy push, being essentially preexistent, or too difficult to achieve because local interests, or culture, or both, deny it political traction. 10. Hard and soft power should be complementary, though often they are not entirely so. U.S. national style, reflecting the full array of American values as a hegemonic power, has been known to give some cultural and hence political offense abroad, even among objective allies and other friends. Whereas competent strategy enables hard military power to be all, or most of what it can be, soft power does not lend itself readily to strategic direction. 11. Provided the different natures of hard and soft power are understood—the critical distinguishing factor being coercion versus attraction—it is appropriate to regard the two kinds of power as mutual enablers. However, theirs is an unequal relationship. The greater attractiveness of soft power is more than offset in political utility by its inherent unsuitability for policy direction and control. From all the factors above, it follows that military force will long remain an essential instrument of policy. That said, popular enthusiasm in Western societies for the placing of serious restraints on the use of force can threaten the policy utility of the military. The ill consequences of America’s much-manifested difficulty in thinking and behaving strategically are augmented perilously when unwarranted faith is placed upon soft power that inherently is resistant to strategic direction. Although it is highly appropriate to be skeptical of the policy utility of soft power, such skepticism must not be interpreted as implicit advice to threaten or resort to military force with scant reference to moral standards. Not only is it right in an absolute sense, it is also expedient to seek, seize, and hold the moral high ground. There can be significant strategic advantage in moral advantage—to risk sounding cynical. Finally, it is essential to recognize that soft power tends to work well when America scarcely has need of it, but the more challenging contexts for national security require the mailed fist, even if it is cushioned, but not concealed, by a glove of political and ethical restraint.

Multiple alt causes to soft power – Gitmo, warming, and the economy. **Beinart 10**

[6-21-10, Peter Beinart is an associate professor of journalism and political science at the City University of New York and a senior fellow at the New America Foundation, “How the Financial Crisis Has Undermined U.S. Power”, <http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1995884,00.html>]

The Obama Administration's charm offensive hasn't been a complete failure. Personally, Obama is far more popular overseas than was George W. Bush, and that popularity has brought the nastiness of adversaries like Mahmoud Ahmadinejad into sharper relief. But the very nastiness of those adversaries means that they don't get rattled by low favorability ratings. What's more, Obama's efforts to change America's image have been constrained by his inability to change certain U.S. policies at home. The best way for America to promote its values is "by living them," declares the National Security Strategy, but when it comes to closing Guantánamo Bay or dramatically reducing U.S. carbon emissions, Congress has shown little interest in making Washington a shining city on a hill. These problems, however, pale before the overarching one: despite Obama's personal popularity, American soft power isn't going up; it's going down. The reason is the financial crisis. America's international allure has always been based less on the appeal of the man in the Oval Office than on the appeal of the American political and economic model. Regardless of what foreigners thought of Bill Clinton, in the 1990s America's brand of deregulated democracy seemed the only true path to prosperity. American economists, investment bankers and political consultants fanned out across the globe to preach the gospel of free elections and free markets. America represented, in Francis Fukuyama's famous words, "The End of History." (See pictures of Obama in Russia.) Now it is much less clear that history is marching our way. The financial crisis has undermined the prestige of America's economic model at the very moment that China's authoritarian capitalism is rising. A decade ago, poor governments hungry for trade and aid had no choice but to show up in Washington, where they received lectures about how to make their economies resemble America's. Now they can get twice the money and half the moralizing in Beijing. From Iran to Burma to Sudan, the Obama Administration's charm offensive has been undermined by China's cash offensive.

No nukes - Terrorists won’t use nukes – damages their causes. **Kapur 08**

[S. Paul – Assoc Prof in Dept of Strategic Research at the US Naval War College. “Nuclear Terrorism,” in The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia. Ed. Muthiah Alagappa. p. 324]

Before a terrorist group can attempt to use nuclear weapons, it must meet two basic requirements. First, the group must decide that it wishes to engage in nuclear terrorism. Analysts and policy makers often assume that terrorist groups necessarily want to do so (Carter 2004; U.S. Government 2002). However, it is not clear that terrorist organizations would necessarily covet nuclear devices. Although analysts often characterize terrorism as an irrational activity (Laqeuer 1999: 4-5), extensive empirical evidence indicates that terrorist groups in fact be- have rationally, adopting strategies designed to achieve particular ends (Crenshaw 1995: 4; Pape 2003: 344). Thus whether terrorists would use nuclear weapons is contingent on whether doing so is likely to further their goals. Under what circumstances could nuclear weapons fail to promote terrorists' goals? For certain types of terrorist objectives, nuclear weapons could be too de- structive. Large-scale devastation could negatively influence audiences important to the terrorist groups. Terrorists often rely on populations sympathetic to their cause for political, financial, and military support. The horrific destruction of a nuclear explosion could alienate segments of this audience. People who otherwise would sympathize with the terrorists may conclude that in using a nuclear device terrorists had gone too far and were no longer deserving of support. The catastrophic effects of nuclear weapons could also damage or destroy the very thing that the terrorist group most values. For example, if a terrorist orga- nization were struggling with another group for control of their common home- land, the use of nuclear weapons against the enemy group would devastate the terrorists' own home territory. Using nuclear weapons would be extremely counter- productive for the terrorists in this scenario. It is thus not obvious that all terrorist groups would use nuclear weapons. Some groups would probably not. The propensity for nuclear acquisition and use by ter- rorist groups must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.

Ukraine proves Soft power fails. **Cecire 14**

Micael Cecire, April 1, 2014, The Limits of Soft Power, Michael Cecire is an independent Caucasus analyst and an associate scholar at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia., http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-limits-soft-power-10163

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has already punctured much of the prevailing foreign-policy thinking that had become pro forma in Washington and Europe. In particular, the notion that Western unilateral disarmament can somehow be balanced or compensated for with less tangible forms of influence—soft power—has much to answer for in this ongoing crisis. By now, it is clear that **Moscow’s actions in Crimea strongly demonstrate the sharp limits of soft power**, especially one that appears to have been decoupled from hard power, the traditional final arbiter of interstate relations. **Ukraine is not merely a geopolitical setback, but a symptom of a misplaced faith in the potency of postmodern soft power as foreign policy plan A through Z.** Ukraine’s rapid transformation from *homo Sovieticus*–ruled kleptocracy to inspiring popular revolution to the latest victim of Russian imperialism has been astonishing. In the span of mere weeks, Ukraine’s political cleavages have been magnified as the faultline of a tense geopolitical contest between the Euro-Atlantic community and a revanchist, increasingly militant Russia. In the Western scramble to come to terms with the new threat landscape—let alone formulating an effective, unified response—[Crimea has almost certainly already been lost](http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/03/09/gates_crimea_is_already_gone). Meanwhile, Russia seems poised to expand its writ into other areas of eastern Ukraine just as it aggressively probes Euro-Atlantic readiness in the Baltic, Turkey, and the Caucasus. In Washington, defense and administration officials appear resigned—if only unofficially—[to Russian control over Crimea (if not eastern Ukraine) and are digging in for the long haul](http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jO7A7DCnBHg_m2r2Wuq_oyWNSwyg?docId=63246160-ba79-498c-8fbc-d7fa83cc2089). How did we get here? Among the ideologues, the answer lies in the foreign policies of the current or previous administrations. On the right, President Obama’s “reset” and subordination of foreign policy to domestic issues is the obvious cause. And on the left, President Bush’s wars have given the Kremlin the perfect moral justification. But the reality, like many things, is hardly one sided. Partisans decrying President Obama’s “weakness” appear to ignore that the administration's response to Russia’s occupation of Crimea is already far more muscular than President Bush’s reaction to the Russian invasion of Georgia 2008. And conversely, some of the left’s bizarre use of a war they supposedly opposed to equivocate on the invasion of a sovereign state by corrupt autocracy is as self-contradictory as it is troubling. The likelier culprit is not so intimately tethered to the tribalisms of American politics, though ideology inevitably has played a role. Instead, **the Western political class has become intoxicated with the notion that soft power, now the highly fashionable foreign-policy instrument of first resort, can compensate for—or in some ways replace altogether—diminished hard power.** If the late 1990s was the heyday for liberal internationalism by airpower, the late 2000s saw an analogous consensus congregate around soft power. Soft power is supposed to describe the latent factors—values, economy, culture and the like—of a state, entity or idea to persuade or attract. This contrasts with its more recognizable counterpart, hard power, which is based on the more traditional principle of coercion. There is little doubt that soft power is a real and fundamentally important phenomenon in the conduct of international relations. Contributions from scholars like Joseph Nye and Giulio Gallarotti have made a compelling case that soft power is a powerful geopolitical signifier; but what began as a keen observation had morphed into a cottage industry looking to leverage soft power into a foreign-policy panacea. | [**In an illuminating 2011 paper published by the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College, University of Reading (U.K.) political scientist Colin S. Gray rightly acknowledges the merits of the soft-power thesis**](http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1059.pdf) **while articulating its practical limitations, particularly in the policy arena.** “While it is sensible to seek influence abroad as cost-effectively as possible, it is only prudent to be modest in one's expectations of the soft power to be secured by cultural influence,” cautions Gray. Indeed, soft power’s attraction and subsequent embrace by the foreign policy elite had as much to do with its usefulness as a substitute for “hard power” as its salience as an idea. But while hard and soft power can be complementary, Gray observes that soft power can in no way compensate for military power. “Sad to say,” laments Gray, “there is no convincing evidence suggesting an absence of demand for the threat and use of military force.” Sad, indeed. However, events in Ukraine have exposed the stark limits of soft power in a way that no analysis ever could. There is no small irony in the fact that Russia’s forceful military intervention into Ukraine was preceded by a grinding, if superficially velveted, tug of war between Moscow and the West over Ukraine’s integration with two competing soft-power “vehicles”—the EU and the Moscow-led Customs Union-cum-Eurasian Union. It was Yanukovych’s abandonment of Ukraine’s pledge to sign an Association Agreement with the EU—following intense Russian coercion—that protests began again in earnest. Yanukovych’s turn to brutality eventually precipitated his toppling, Russia’s military intervention, and now Crimea’s annexation. **The idea of soft power as operational policy should be buried. While there is some government role in propagating and wielding soft power—public affairs, policy making, and, yes, sometimes psychological operations—the real business of soft power is exists well outside of the domain of the state. In reality, the track record of operationalizing** **soft power has been, to date, abysmal. Russia is a case in point. Moscow repeatedly sought to revise the post-Cold War order through a variety of projects that might normally be filed as soft-power initiatives: then president Dmitry Medvedev’s repeated attempts to reorient the European security architecture; the Kremlin obsession with making the ruble an international reserve currency; the formation of the Russia-led Customs Union in 2010; and the (now likely stillborn) plans to establish the Eurasian Union. And yet, in the end, Crimea was forcibly seized by men with guns.** Indeed, **the truer currency of power remains the ability to coerce**. Fatigue from disastrous wars in Iraq and Afghanistan elevated expectations that soft power could supplant a beleaguered and overstretched U.S. military. Why, indeed, would the U.S. opt for coercion when civilizational persuasion could do the trick? Pro-West people power in Eurasia seemed to bolster the case for operationalized soft power after the “color revolutions” in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. [Yet the longer-term results were unpredictable at best and disastrous at worst](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/18/why_the_color_revolutions_failed). Over time, it has become increasingly apparent that soft power is perhaps less an instrument to wield than a favorable wind at our backs. The crisis with Russia has laid bare the limits of soft power as well as the continued relevance of hard power—even in “postmodern” Europe. While the Obama administration should be credited with being among the few Western governments to offer a relatively serious response to the Ukraine crisis, the White House overall still seems uncomfortable with the difficult but very real role that hard power necessarily plays in establishing and policing a U.S.-led, liberal normative order. This must change with the new circumstances established by Russian revanchism. Western values can only be propagated and upheld with the ultimate guarantee of hard power. And if the West is not prepared to enforce its values with tangible consequences, then perhaps we should abandon the pretense of a rules-based international system and cease the cruel practice of giving hope where there is none to be had. **Soft power is here to stay, but its moment as a diplomatic instrument has long since gone. Because, in reality, it was never really much more than an illusion of what we wished the world to be rather than the one that exists.**

Multiple other policies crush soft power. **Brenner 14**

Michael Brenner, March 17, 2014, Huffington Post, “The sins of arrogance bear bitter fruit”

As a result, **American "soft power" is now in steep decline**. Above all, **the country's moral authority has been shredded by Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, "collateral" killings, drones and indiscriminate spying on all and sundry. Iraq, Afghanistan - to a lesser extent, and the compulsively vengeful hunt world-wide for anyone and everyone who may wish to do the United States harm has created the impression of a relentless juggernaut on automatic pilot. Moreover, the original course bearings were dangerously off - launching the country into the vast and unhospitable reaches of diplomatic outer space**. American audacity in presuming to transform Iraq into a Western style country modeling liberal democracy for the rest of the Middle East was the logical extremity of strategy by grandiose fantasy. The resulting fiasco has damaged national interests - in addition to imposing immense harm on the Iraqis whom we used as Guinea pigs in this amateurish experiment. Yet, in the face of abject failure, the nation's political elites have lacked the humility to acknowledge error - much less to repent by reappraising the conceit that enabled the adventure. Then to put on a repeat performance in Afghanistan circa 2004-present evinces an exalted sense of self, impervious to experience, that has become a manifest national liability. The United States' leaders, and Americans themselves, show little awareness of these developments. On occasion after occasion, from place to place, the implicit belief that we are masters of the universe with a right, indeed an obligation, to judge all and take whatever action America deems appropriate is as strong as it ever has been. If anything, the trauma of 9/11 has reinvigorated the righteous streak in the American outlook on the world that feeds the sense of privilege. That belief is seen in our inflated strategic vision and our day-to-day behavior both. The latter category has been swollen in recent months by a veritable plethora of revealing anecdotes. There was Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland's escapade in Kiev where she presumptuously tried to dictate the country's future to all local factions, to the European Union, Russia and whomever else was in hearing range of her "charming" salted language. No correction or honest apology followed. An attitude that sees the world as a Play Station to which only Americans have access leaves us shocked and uncomprehending when the Russians act as they have done in Ukraine. Washington leaders denounce Russia's incursion into the Crimea as a violation of international law and a clear act of aggression. They seem oblivious to the implications of United States' own rogue behavior in invading/occupying Iraq without a legal mandate and without a cassis belli. However one might judge the particulars of the cases, there is a double standard here that a reasonable, responsible government should address. The failure to recognize that logical connection speaks volumes about American self-determined exceptionialism. To take as a birthright privileges denied others is to strike the high Cs of an exalted Americanism